Indigenousness, human rights, ethnicity, language and power

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Abstract

Skutnabb-Kangas agrees here with Fishman in asserting the important place that power holds in cultural autonomy. But, at the same time, Skutnabb-Kangas disagrees with Fishman’s optimistic claims regarding the growing acceptance of the right of Indigenous/tribal peoples and minorities/minoritized groups to public resources to operate institutions in their languages. To do so, Skutnabb-Kangas refers to how the different conventions and frameworks in support of minority languages create only minimal legal obligations and offer minimal public State resources, if any. Specifically, she uses the case of the Kurds in North Kurdistan to describe how the Turkish state’s rejection of the rights of Kurds to self-rule and self-determination has resulted in strengthening the link between their language, ethnicity and land/territory. And the case of the tribals in India and Nepal illustrates how multilingual education has been increasingly embraced as important to their cultural survival, as well as their structural incorporation. The question of power is essential to any discussion of cultural autonomy.

Keywords: Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP); Education for All (EFA); European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; India; indigenous; indigenous/tribal peoples and minorities/minoritized groups (ITMs); International Labour Organisation (ILO); Kurds; language rights; mother tongue-based multilingual education (MLE); Nepal; North Kurdistan; power; racism; Roma; structural incorporation; Turkey.

1. Introduction

Joshua Fishman (hereafter JF) has, as usual, written a very rich and complex narrative, full of wisdom and novel insights. It is thus humbly and

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with trepidation that I, as a chela, offer a few comments on my great guru’s article.

2. Indigenousness

First, Indigenousness — as JF correctly notes, “the very term ‘indigenous’ itself remains nebulous in terms of the time depth required for it to become consensually operative”. He also writes that the Indigenous peoples are those who are “popularly speaking, non-immigrant or autochthonous.” Drawing on international law, Teresa McCarty and I (Skutnabb-Kangas and McCarty 2008: 7) present some definitions of Indigenous peoples:

Communities, peoples, and nations which, having a historical continuity within pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed within their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the society(ies) now prevailing in those territories. They form non-dominant sectors of society determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, identity, and often, their language as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their cultural practices and social and legal systems (Cobo 1987: 4).

The International Labour Organisation’s (ILO’s) 1989 definition1 may be the strongest legally:

...peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

Self-identification is included within the ILO definition “as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply” (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm).

Symptomatically, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) does not define Indigenous peoples.

3. Limitations of the legal human rights instruments

UNDRIP and ILO 169 are both global in scope, but both suffer from certain limitations. While the UNDRIP received very broad support within the UN General Assembly, such support was not universal.2 In any case, as a General Assembly declaration, it does not, strictly speaking, create binding legal obliga-
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Nonetheless, the UNDRIP is significant both in political and moral terms, and (parts of) it may evolve into legally “harder” commitments over time.

ILO Convention 169, as a treaty, creates binding legal obligations for those States that ratify it, but thus far, only 22 states have done so. Thus the ILO 169 definition is so far the only “binding” one. Even if it has “the establishment of present state boundaries” as an alternative to “at the time of conquest or colonization” (see above), it is understood that the latter condition is the basic one. Thus neither Black people nor Hispanics in the southern parts of the USA would be Indigenous — they were not there at the time of the conquest. They are minorities. And in any case, the USA has not ratified ILO 169. Even if President Obama now supports the UNDRIP, it is non-binding.

Likewise, JF is in my view overly optimistic in his claim that there is now a growing acceptance of Indigenous peoples having rights to public resources in order to operate various institutions using indigenous languages to an extent chosen by the concerned peoples themselves.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) states in Articles 13.1 and 14.1–3:

13.1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.

14.1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.

14.2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms of education of the State without discrimination.

14.3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language (emphases added).

The first two articles imply that the child has the right to learn the mother tongue. Since most forms and levels of the “education of the State” (14.2) use the “State” languages as a medium, the child cannot have access to this education without knowing the State language. These quotes together might imply that high levels of at least bilingualism must be a goal in the education of an Indigenous child. But since state education through the medium of the dominant state language is “free” (even if there are school fees even in elementary education in many countries where Indigenous peoples live), most Indigenous children are forced to “choose” the “state education”. Their parents are “free”
to establish and control their own educational systems, with their own lan-
guages as teaching languages — but at their own cost. How many Indigenous
and tribal peoples can afford this? There is nothing about the State having to
allocate public resources to Indigenous-language-medium education.4

The “when possible” drawback in Article 14.3 also fits all too well with
similar modifications and conditions in the Council of Europe’s European
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (the “Minority Languages Char-
ter”)5 and Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
(the “Framework Convention”);6 both came into force in 1998. The Minority
Languages Charter’s education Article, 8, includes a range of modifications,
including “as far as possible”, “relevant”, “appropriate”, “where necessary”,
“pupils who so wish in a number considered sufficient”, “if the number of
users of a regional or minority language justifies it”, as well as a number of
alternatives, as in “to allow, encourage or provide teaching in or of the regional
or minority language at all the appropriate stages of education” (emphases
added).

The Article in the Framework Convention, covering medium of education is
so heavily qualified that the minority is completely at the mercy of the state:

In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in sub-
stantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the parties shall endeavour to ensure,
as far as possible and within the framework of their education systems, that persons
belonging to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught in the
minority language or for receiving instruction in this language (emphases added for
modifications).

Thus, JF’s optimistic assessments, both globally and for Europe in relation
to the legal situation of Indigenous/tribal peoples and minorities/minoritized
groups (hereafter ITMs) are, I am afraid, a more sociological “ought” inter-
pretation than a legal “is”. This is also true in relation to the position of the Roma.
In addition, JF’s assessment that the numbers of the Roma are “difficult to
ascertain due to their lifestyle of making themselves invisible to all authori-
ties” neglects the most important reason for the lack of demographic data
about them, namely racism. JF also, erroneously, seems to think that “Finnish
speakers in Sweden” have reached “the acme [the point at which something is
best, perfect, or most successful] of language rights for minority peoples”.
Even if Sweden has declared Finnish a national minority language in terms of
the “Minority Languages Charter” and has recently broadened the areas where
Finnish speakers have some rights, they have, for instance, no right to school
education through the medium of Finnish in the Charter’s Article 8; the only
ones in Sweden who have rights to Finnish-medium services are children
under school age and old people. Maybe JF means Swedish speakers in Fin-
land? We (Swedish speakers in Finland) have, arguably, the best legal protection in the world for our language and culture (in addition to French speakers in Québec and English speakers in South Africa).

4. The case of Kurds in North Kurdistan

JF’s discussion about ethnic or class struggle in relation to demands on cultural autonomy and modernity is extremely interesting, complex and full of details; a proper reaction could be book-length. I will only touch upon a couple of issues, using the situation of the Kurds in North Kurdistan (the Turkish part of Kurdistan) as an example. First, one of the main arguments of states to reject “the rights of minorities to self-rule or self-determination” is, according to JF, “the presumably greater sanctity of ‘territorial integrity’ of already recognized states”, where “the principles of territorial unity and integrity have been applied by the States only to themselves. Presumably, the reason for doing so is to bring about the separation of indigenous territoriality from ethnicity”.

The Kurdish political court case in Turkey, which started in mid-October 2010, is a case in point. Margaret Owen, a human rights lawyer, writes: “Charged with ‘violating the unity of the state’ and ‘abetting terrorism’ are 151 Kurdish politicians, lawyers, mayors and leaders of Kurdish civil society. Of these, 103 have already been in detention for the past 18 months, but details of the charges were not disclosed until 12 weeks ago” (Owen 2010). Owen followed the first week of the trial, a trial that as she said, “would shame any democracy”. Thousands of Kurds, including children have been and are in prison; thousands have been beaten up, tortured and killed, for “crimes” that would not be crimes in most other countries (China in relation to both Tibetans and Uyghurs is an exception, with equally harsh treatment — but sometimes children are spared). Article 3 of the Turkish Constitution states: “The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.” Article 4 states that the provision of Article 3 may not be amended, nor may their amendment be proposed. Kurdish-medium schools are not allowed. Kurdish children do not have the right to study their mother tongue as a subject in schools and demands for this can carry prison sentences. In theory, courses in the Kurdish language can be taught to teenagers and adults, but in practice the obstacles and conditions have been so many and so bureaucratically and legally demanding that there are next to no courses. Letters that do not exist in the Turkish language are not allowed in names; this makes many Kurdish names illegal.7 Villages in North Kurdistan have started to set up bilingual road signs with the names of their village in both Turkish and Kurdish. In November 2010 The Council of State declared that all 91 bilingual road signs must be removed because “the road signs with the Kurdish names would cause
problems for postal and transportation services” (MESOP 2010). The
Diyarbakır Governor’s office in a statement said: “Turkey is an indivisible
country and nation, its language is Turkish.” It also said that addresses in other
languages would lead to chaos (MESOP, 2010).

JF assumes that the state intends, through this kind of measures, to “bring
about the separation of indigenous territoriality from ethnicity”. In the case of
the Kurds, it seems that exactly the opposite is happening; the link between
language, ethnicity and land/territory is strengthened. This also means that the
Turkish state does not follow any kind of rational-choice policy. In fact, the
term “choice” itself “is a misnomer. The whole logic of choice is predicated on
the fact that human beings are rational seekers of self-interest and base their
decisions on rational calculation and free will” (Kabel 2010, private email).
People (and groups, including states) are supposed to weigh different alternative
strategies and choose the one that maximizes their benefits and profit. Is
Turkey doing this? In the case of the Kurds, who have been betrayed time after
time by western states, mainly Britain, France and the United States, the NATO
ally, Turkey, would not be able to continue the gross human rights violations
without their continued support. Autonomy or independence for the Kurds
would deprive Turkey of control of water, oil, minerals, etc. in North Kurdistan
— and UK and USA of oil pipes and a vital weapons buyer (see Skutnabb-
Kangas and Fernandes [2008]; see also Mark Curtis’s excellent analyses of
Britain’s global role [1995, 2003, 2010]). So, maybe Turkey is acting rationally
— but both Turkey (maybe no EU membership?) and, especially, the Kurds,
are paying a very high price.

5.

Language, ethnic identity and choice

I fully agree with JF’s statement: “The spiritual link to tradition, the self con-
cept and the identity of the populations themselves and their psychological
links to ancestral and historical lands, lakes and mountains have very generally
been undervalued by leading Western circles who have essentially become
products of the landless culture of territorially detached globalism”. There are
too many intellectual games among post-modernist rootless hybrid analyzers
of ethnicity.

Back to ethnicity, language and rational choice. One type of “proof” of the
absence of a link between language and identity presented by those sociolinguists who criticize what they call “essentialism” (and in their view JF would
represent that, and so would I) builds on rational-choice theory: if the link be-
tween identity and language were strong, the benefits of maintaining a mother
tongue would weigh more than the benefits of shifting to a dominant language
and minority parents would choose to speak their own language to their chil-
Children and choose it as the main school language. The “exponentially increasing phenomenon of language shift” can only be explained by “the absence of a link between identity and particular languages”, Stephen May writes (2005: 328–329). Ahmed Kabel (see his 2010 article) calls rational-choice theory “sacred liberal dogma”. He continues:

The fact of the matter is that parents “make choices” with regard to languages under enormous structural constraints. Some of these constraints may be too flagrantly palpable to simply ignore: violence, dispossession, threat to life . . . while others may be beyond the conscious awareness of the actors themselves. Also, given the overwhelming amount of indoctrination and propaganda as well the systemic violence that they are subjected to, parents can hardly be said to be meaningfully “choosing” (Kabel 2010, private email).

The structural constraints in Turkish Kurdistan prevent any choice. What the Kurds want in relation to language and culture is just the same basic rights that any dominant groups have — cultural autonomy, including the right to learn their language(s), and use it/them freely in society, including schools. When comparing the educational levels of girls from the poorest households in Turkey, the EFA (Education for All) Global Monitoring Report 2010 states (UNESCO 2010: 9): “In Turkey, 43% of Kurdish-speaking girls from the poorest households have fewer than two years of education, while the national average is 6%.” These figures reflect the submersion education through the medium of Turkish to which Kurdish children are subjected. The right to mother-tongue based multilingual education is not any “special” right. In addition, Kurds, of course, want some kind of political self-determination which does not necessarily include independence. Without more political and economic self-determination cultural autonomy is not possible for them; likewise, investments in infrastructure, including health and education8 are not forthcoming. Thus (ethnicity-based) cultural autonomy, with expressive rights (see below) — which under more equal and democratic conditions might be enough, simply requires more instrumental political and economic rights as a precondition.

On July 14, 2011 the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), a platform that brings together Kurdish non-government organizations, declared “democratic autonomy” within Turkey’s territorial integrity. DTK’s chairwoman, Aysel Tuğluk, MP, stated that the Kurdish problem could only be solved if Kurds are recognized as a distinct group but with equal status (i.e. cultural autonomy with structural incorporation, see below) (Today’s Zaman, 2011). On August 2, 2011 Tuğluk was sentenced to two years of jail for “disseminating political propaganda” for the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK (The Kurdistan Tribune, 2011).
6. Language rights

This leads us to the question of class and/or ethnicity, and which emphases various actors choose. Two kinds of interest in language rights can be distinguished, according to Ruth Rubio-Marín (Professor of Constitutional Law in Seville, Spain). One is “the expressive interest in language as a marker of identity”, the other an “instrumental interest in language as a means of communication” (Rubio-Marín 2003: 56). The expressive (or non-instrumental) language claims “aim at ensuring a person’s capacity to enjoy a secure linguistic environment in her/his mother tongue and a linguistic group’s fair chance of cultural self-reproduction” (Rubio-Marín 2003: 56).

It is only these expressive language rights that Rubio-Marín calls “language rights in a strict sense” (2003: 56), i.e. these could be seen as linguistic human rights (LHRs). The formulation above beautifully integrates the individual rights of ITMs with their collective rights. It is mainly these expressive rights, or lack of them, that are exemplified in Fishman (1997). Educational language rights, on the other hand, seem superficially to be more about instrumental rights. These instrumental language claims “aim at ensuring that language is not an obstacle to the effective enjoyment of rights with a linguistic dimension, to the meaningful participation in public institutions and democratic process, and to the enjoyment of social and economic opportunities that require linguistic skills” (Rubio-Marín 2003: 56).

But the educational linguistic rights discussed in connection with UNDRIP and ILO 169 above show clearly that good ITM education has both expressive and instrumental goals. Unfortunately these insights are adversely affected when some instrumentalists claim that those interested in the expressive aspects exclude the more instrumental communication-oriented aspects (for instance unequal class- or gender-based access to formal language or to international languages). The debates in 2003 numbers of the Journal of Language, Identity and Education are an example of this old division based on outmoded ideas being reinvented again. The same debates have been fought already in the 1960s and 1970s, both over integration of minorities (are they more interested in their languages, or in jobs) and over indigenous claims (are they more interested in identity, language and traditions, or in autonomy/land rights). Most ITMs are mostly interested in both types of rights, expressive and instrumental, and often one is a prerequisite for the other, with both being alternately causal and dependent variables. The Kurdish case is a good example of this. Many of us work with both aspects, and see them as complementary, not mutually exclusive.

It is important to relate the societal goals of cultural autonomy and self-determination to how the powerful dominant groups (including the state) and the dominated groups see the future of the dominated groups (here Indigenous,
tribal, minority or minoritized groups/peoples, ITMs). Schermerhorn’s (1970: 80) useful typology of the collective goals of minorities and the extent to which a majority (or dominant group) in a country agrees or disagrees with them is still useful. In describing these goals, he distinguishes between two aspects of assimilation — the economic-structural (“economic and occupational life, marriage and the family, education, government, and recreation”, the alternatives being structural incorporation or autonomy) and the cultural (assimilation or pluralism). The dominant and subordinated groups can agree or disagree, partially or totally, with the collective goals for the subordinated group. If both groups want the same for the subordinated group in terms of both structure and culture, for instance structural incorporation (SI+) and cultural assimilation (CA+), meaning INCORPORATION at the structural level and ASSIMILATION at the cultural level, there is total agreement. If on the other hand the dominant group wants these two goals (SI+, CA+) for the subordinated group, while the group itself does not want structural incorporation but wants structural AUTONOMY (SI−), and does not want cultural assimilation but cultural PLURALISM (CA−), there is total disagreement. Partial agreement and disagreement are also possible and common.

US melting pot ideology expects all citizens to adopt the American way of life and ideals, in order to become “good Americans”. On the other hand, the democratic ideal demands that everyone should be given equal educational and economic opportunities. The official ideology of the majority thus represents cultural assimilation but structural incorporation. This mythical American Dream has always been about granting everybody a chance of structural incorporation into an economically and politically just democratic society. But the price to be paid has also, despite some early tolerance of official multilingualism, been extremely clear — total cultural assimilation. Theodore Roosevelt (the USA president 1901–1909) wrote:

We must have but one flag. We must also have but one language. . . . We cannot tolerate any attempt to oppose or supplant the language and culture that has come down to us from the builders of this Republic. . . . We call upon all loyal and unadulterated Americans to man the trenches against the enemy within our gates. (Roosevelt 1917; emphasis added)

Roosevelt also wrote in 1919, in a letter to the next president:

In the first place, we should insist that if the immigrant who comes here in good faith becomes an American and assimilates himself to us, he shall be treated on an exact equality with everyone else, for it is an outrage to discriminate against any such man because of creed, or birthplace, or origin. But this is predicated upon the person’s becoming in every facet an American, and nothing but an American. . . . There can be no
divided allegiance here. *Any man who says he is an American, but something else also, isn’t an American at all.* We have room for but one flag, the American flag. . . . We have room for but one language here, and that is the English language . . . and we have room for but one sole loyalty and that is a loyalty to the American people”. (Quoted from Skutnabb-Kangas and Fernandes [2008: 55–56]; emphases added).

Turkey has followed the same policy — all roads are open to Kurds who are 100% assimilated culturally. Most ITMs, though, do not want cultural assimilation. On the other hand, most do want access to goods and services and the institutional benefits of the “mainstream” society. This would be a case of agreement on structural incorporation, but disagreement on the need for cultural assimilation. A consensus where the dominant group agrees to both structural incorporation and cultural pluralism (which could include cultural autonomy of some kind), would be very unusual in today’s world. An example would be Swedish-speakers in Finland, with one of the best minority protections in the world and full agreement, with both the (Finnish-speaking) majority and the minority (Swedish-speakers) agreeing on the goals — full incorporation politically, economically, and socially and on the labor market, but no cultural and linguistic assimilation.

7. Linguistic assimilation and social injustice

All statistics from the USA tell us that Indigenous peoples, African Americans and Spanish-speaking (immigrant) minority groups (e.g. García 2009) suffer from the results of discrimination socially and economically (see Skutnabb-Kangas and Dunbar [2010] on these results). Indicators of the results of social injustice, including low levels of formal education among these groups, show that the promises of structural incorporation have not materialized for many groups. At the same time, the linguistic and cultural assimilation demands are still as harsh as in Roosevelt’s formulations. Most Indigenous peoples in North America have lost their languages (see, e.g. Bear Nicholas 2009, McCarty 2009, Reyhner et al. 1999) and recent immigrants are more or less monolingual in English by the third generation. Many groups have paid the price (i.e. tried to assimilate) but have not, at the group level, got what was promised, even if many individuals and even some groups, especially from South Asia, have “succeeded” economically. Debate about whether the economic success that some groups may have achieved, at the cost of being forced to assimilate, has been worth it, and whether there are alternatives, have not been widespread in the USA or Canada, or, for that matter, Africa, and has not led to large-scale minority organizing around linguistic and cultural demands. This may still happen when people realize what the price that they have paid or are in the process of paying might mean.
Some groups/peoples in other countries have mobilized differently, starting with linguistic and cultural demands. It is possible that some of them have achieved or are in the process of achieving more rights also in terms of structural incorporation than those who initially strove towards incorporation only, at the cost of language and culture (see, e.g. Aikio-Puoskari [2009] on the Saami — see also the comparison of the relative success of strategies used by, respectively, the Deaf and the Saami in Skutnabb-Kangas and Aikio-Puoskari [2003]).

8. Indigenous/tribal peoples in India and Nepal

In many — but by no means all — Asian countries cultural and linguistic pluralism have been much more widely accepted and, in some of them (such as India and Nepal)\(^9\) codified in constitutions and other legal texts. Here we can also see that Indigenous/tribal peoples and even many national linguistic minorities are excluded from social justice in the sense of structural incorporation. The structural inequalities are often discussed in addition to linguistic, ethnic and cultural characteristics or even only in terms of class/caste hierarchies (which are often language-based or coincide with ethnicity- and language-related characteristics). It seems that many tribals in India and Nepal, where the formative foundations of social identity are their language, culture and ethnicity, together with the land (often seen holistically as inseparable), are now at the same time striving for both structural incorporation and cultural and linguistic rights, especially in education, using innovative strategies (e.g. Dalits).

Looking back at the history of small and large tribal protests and movements in India, one finds that more often than not, the tribals began their protest essentially for land. They did not want to lose their language, but language was definitely not an issue, since they did not collectively perceive it as a resource, or a marker of identity or, at least, did not consider it at risk. Their collective protests were sporadically organized in time and space, and in small groups. Only when these led to big movements, as in the case of Bodos and Santhalis, were these three bases of identity conceptually distinguished by the leaders. But for the common people they were one and the same. Because of the multilingual ethos and multiglossia, non-use of tribal languages in formal/official spaces like school was not construed by the speakers of those language as a process that might lead to loss of their own language, and therefore, their culture and their ethnicity, except where collective processes were strong. Therefore, until a few years ago, the demand for mother-tongue-based multilingual education, MLE, was still weak among tribal parents. In a few states like Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, MLE was implemented in a few pilot schools...
because of decisions taken at the state bureaucratic level and not because the parents of the tribal children demanded it. However, one can say that many tribal parents have now started noticing the benefits of MLE for their children in Orissa and Andhra and have started lending emotional and moral support to these initiatives (see http://www.nmrc-jnu.org/ for comprehensive descriptions). They have also started seeing language as a resource, a cultural capital. But still there are very few demands for any kind of cultural autonomy (Skutnabb-Kangas et al. 2009).

Thus in many contexts worldwide, ITMs live in societies which are organized so as to exclude them both from structural incorporation that might lead to more just societies socially, economically and politically, and from the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of their languages and cultures (a negative right) and to maintain and develop these (a positive right), in addition to having access to additional languages and cultures, including the dominant ones. If we take this situation as reflecting the intentions of the dominant groups, regardless of the extent to which the intention is overtly expressed (or even when the opposite is expressed in declarations and laws), what requires analysis is to what extent ITMs agree with these goals. One might safely assume that none of them agree with the goal of not having the right and opportunity to achieve full structural incorporation, while most of them take their languages and cultures as self-evident, and many do not see their loss as a possibility — yet. We are now starting to get results showing that well-conducted MLE can reach both goals (structural incorporation and linguistic and cultural pluralism) (see results on the website of the Indian National Multilingual Education Resource Consortium, http://www.nmrc-jnu.org/; see also Mohanty and Skutnabb-Kangas 2010).

9. Power, structural incorporation and linguistic assimilation

Important questions then are: To what extent do those who “want” linguistic and cultural assimilation think that this is a necessary price to pay for structural incorporation? Do they believe in the myth that they have to choose between the two goals? Are they made to believe that it is a zero-sum game? To what extent do they know what the long-term consequences of their choices are, and is there in reality any choice in these power games?

JF notes, correctly, that the notion of power is crucial, and currently still lacking for a proper understanding of most sociolinguistic phenomena, a central sociological and political science question where theories abound. He then discusses social power as “the control of scarce resources”, asserting that social power is “directly proportional to the degree of control a well as to the degree of scarcity” and ends with the claim that “both of these considerations
are at heart quantitative (and therefore, in principle, measurable and expressible as matters of degree), therefore making it possible to quantify the degree of power that any party to a sociolinguistic contest brings to attempts to arbitrate that contest”.

Some basic questions about what power is include whether it is something that “is” and that individuals or groups can “have” or not. Is power (only?) created in discourse relations (for different but possibly complementary views see, e.g., Bourdieu [1977, 1992]; Feldman [1991]; Foucault [1980]). Many theorists of power would probably question the conceptualization of power as a measurable object. Power is something that is performed; it exists, manifests itself, only in the situation where it is performed. But even within theories where some aspects of power exist regardless of the situation (comprising of, for instance, Bourdieu’s various relevant habitus and social and linguistic capital considerations where at least linguistic capital as an instrument of power might be to some extent measurable), JF’s claim about quantification might not hold. I have often used the Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung’s (especially [1980], further developed in [1988]) three-partite division of power (e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas 1988, 2000, e.g. Chapter 6). Galtung differentiates between three types of power: innate power, resource power and structural power.

Even if Galtung’s model of power may at first sound as if power was something that is, rather than something to be negotiated, he sees power as a relational concept, as does JF (and I).

Innate power — “being-power” refers to that which individuals have initially inherited from their parents (nature) but have developed through nurture — intelligence, muscles, health, charisma, etc. (some of Bourdieu’s habitus would correspond to this). Resource power is “having-power”. Resources can be material (capital, weapons, books, houses, cars) or non-material (languages, cultures, traditions, experience, education, knowledge, time). Structural power one has by virtue of one’s position. The three types of power (or parts of them) can be convertible to each other (e.g. the phenomenon of Sarah Palin in USA politics: she has converted her charisma and capital into a shaky position of structural power, which could have been dangerous, had she had more of other aspects of innate and resource power — intelligence of a certain type, and knowledge). The power elites’ control of power is based on attempting to monopolize the right to validate the convertability of the types of innate, resource and structural power that they themselves can muster, and invalidate the resources of others so that these cannot be converted to other types of power. This makes power a relational concept in this type of theorizing. In this optic, ITM resources (material and, especially, immaterial — their languages, cultures, etc) are invalidated and stigmatized and therefore constructed as non-convertible to other already validate resources or to positions of structural power. But even within this type of conceptualizing, only some types of power,
mainly portending to some material resource power — e.g. access to money — are measurable. And even here, the value assessments of material resources (e.g. paintings, houses in certain locations, etc.) depend on class, ethnicity, gender, religion, and other characteristics of the assessors. Thus, regardless of the types of conceptualization of power, the measurableness is highly questionable, even for the types of micro-socio linguistic encounters that JF describes.

10. Conclusion

More research into the essence of power (if indeed there is any essence) is needed. Ending on a slightly pessimistic note, then, my claim is that the work of many sociolinguists/applied linguists, even where it could address them, is irrelevant from the point of view of the world’s major problems, including power relations between the haves and have-nots, where many ITMs are doomed to stay never-to-haves, with neither cultural nor political-economic autonomy. In Ahmed Kabel’s view:

... most research in applied linguistics is out of synch with the real issues as perceived by social actors. This ivory tower syndrome is rife in even some of the self-appointed embarrassingly depoliticized “critical” strand of the discipline. Even worse, some recent scholarship has been after embarrassingly soft targets (flows, hip-hop...). The concepts, paradigms and theories that we employ are either completely irrelevant or dangerous. What is needed is a more activist stance informed by socially and politically accountable forms of knowledge and research (Kabel 2010, private email).

This kind of ivory tower work is in no way dangerous for those global and local corporate forces that are driving the negative, wasteful, consumerist and destructive globalization. JF’s work, including the article that I am commenting on here, is very much in touch with real issues.

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Notes

2. One hundred and forty-three States voted in favor, four opposed the Declaration (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), and eleven States abstained. See http://www.
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As of August 2011, they include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Spain and Venezuela. See: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169.

Skutnabb-Kangas and Dunbar (2010: 16), discusses the possibility of courts being able to draw on at least one recent court case where the principle of no right for parents to choose the medium of instruction was reinterpreted. The principle of 45 years stems from the classical “Belgian linguistic case” (http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int//tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB6142BF01CC1166DEA398649&key=13939&sessionid=28090571&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true). In the 1968 Belgian Linguistic Case, the European Court of Human Rights found that Belgium had not violated the right to education contained in Art. 2 of the First Protocol to the European Covenant on Human Rights when it denied French-speaking parents living in a Flemish-speaking part of Belgium the ability to have their children educated through the medium of French; the court ruled that this right to education did not include a right to be taught in the language of parents’ choice.


Skutnabb-Kangas and Fernandes (2008) for some of the Turkish policies, including Lockheed Martin weapon contracts, oil pipes through Turkey, etc.

Koivunen (2002) shows that the health situation in Kurdistan is as poor as in some of the worst African countries.


References


Cobu,


Mohanty, Ajit & Tove Skutnabb-Kangas. 2010. MLE as an economic equalizer in India and Nepal: mother tongue based multilingual education fights poverty through capability development and identity support. Plenary paper at the conference “Socio Economic Participation of Minorities
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in Relation to their Right to (Respect for) Identity”, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Law, the Netherlands, 26–28 October.


