INTRODUCTION

A national ethnic minority has many more internationally coded rights than any immigrant group. When a minority, created through migration, wants to change its status from a migrant group to a national ethnic minority group, with corresponding legal rights, the party to negotiate with about the validity of this new status is the state. We can exemplify the possibilities of agreement/disagreement as follows:

If both the state and a migrant group itself see the group as temporary migrants, there is no conflict. This was the situation of Italian migrants into Sweden in the fifties - even if most of them in fact have stayed. If both see the group as a national ethnic minority, there is no conflict either. In Sweden this is the situation for the indigenous Same minority. If the group itself sees itself as temporary, whereas the state sees the members as immigrants, there may be a conflict - this is the situation with some refugee groups in Sweden today. And if a group wants to have a national ethnic minority status whereas the state sees it as an immigrant group, there is also a conflict. The options left open by the state to this type of a migrant minority group are thus either to assimilate or to remain immigrants for ever. This is the situation of Sweden Finns today (see Skutnabb-Kangas 1987; in press a,b,c; Widgren 1986).

Finns in Sweden, the largest labour migrant group in Scandinavia, may be of international interest for several reasons. On the one hand, they resemble many other labour migrants. The majority of them are among those many millions who came to industrialised European countries during the last two or three decades in search of work and who stayed in the new country. They moved from the old colony to the country which earlier colonised them (Finland was colonised by Sweden approximately from 1150 to 1809 and was a Russian Grand Duchy between 1809-1917). Some Finns in Sweden are descendants of indigenous Finns who were left on the Swedish side of the border in 1809, i.e. a situation reminiscent of that of Mexican-Americans with both native and migrant groups. On the other hand, Finns differ from many traditional labour migrants on some dimensions in ways which may become more frequent also globally in the future. They moved from one highly developed industrialised country, now one of the richest in the world, to another industrialised country. There are few cultural differences between them and "the hosts" (partly because of the long colonisation) and there is no difference in skin color. Finnish women were more used than Swedish women to being gainfully employed even before migrating: 48% of Finland's working force is female and 80% of them work full time. Even if the Finnish minority is largely working class, everybody has at least a basic education and there are
no more illiterates among the Finns than among the Swedes. Thus it is difficult to legitimate the poor school achievement of Finnish children in Swedish schools or the factual unequal division of power and resources between the Swedes and the Finns with "racial", cultural or social difference explanations such as are often used in relation to migrant groups globally (see Churchill 1986). The only major difference is one of language (Finnish is Finno-Ugric, Swedish Germanic, Indo-European). Language-related explanations for the generally poor school achievement of Finnish children in Sweden have therefore been used (and elaborated - see e.g. Pertti Toukoma’s and my reports for Unesco) earlier than in most comparable countries.

Language seems to be one of the important core values (Smolicz 1979) in Finnish culture, and a sine qua non for Finnish ethnic identity. This is easy to understand because the Finnish speakers in Finland had to struggle for centuries to maintain their language in the colonial era under Swedish rule when it had few rights, and to some extent during the last decades of the 108 years of Russian rule (when Swedish continued to be the official language, and a linguistic assimilation was not demanded by the Russians before the last few decades of their rule). The Swedish language in Sweden has, on the other hand, not been threatened by other languages, regardless of the influences of, respectively, Latin, German and French, as (additional) languages for certain ruling sectors in earlier centuries. There seems to be little awareness among the Swedes of the importance of one's mother tongue, almost regardless of what indicators are used (see examples in Westin 1988, Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1987). The Finnish language has taken on a heavy symbolic and signalling load in Sweden, because it is the main noticeable differentiator between the Finns and the Swedes and because of the relative Finnish awareness and Swedish lack of awareness of the importance of the mother tongue.

Sweden is known for one of the world's most progressive general immigrant policies. The official rhetoric about equality, partnership and freedom of choice (main principles in Swedish immigrant policy, SOU 1974) and minorities as an enrichment, active bilingualism as an educational goal, and intercultural education as a way towards harmony and international understanding (SOU 1983) is impeccable. On the other hand, Swedish attitudes towards the Finnish language in the processes of both interpreting and implementing these centrally defined goals are often extremely negative. This can be seen in the slow development, extreme insecurity and instability, and the harsh opposition in relation to the use of Finnish as the medium in day-care centres, schools, further education and adult education, in the lack of any mother tongue questions in the census despite demands of it, in the lack of requirements of competence in Finnish in jobs, etc. The Finns in Sweden (e.g. The National Union of Finnish Associations) want to have mother tongue medium education for their children, because they know it leads to good results (1). The Swedes have tried and still try to prevent it. The struggle for the right to mother tongue medium education seems to have functioned as the main mobilising factor in the development of the Finns in Sweden from an immigrant group to a group which demands acceptance as a national ethnic minority group (see Peura, in press).

It is unusual that the negative attitudes are expressed as directly as in a recent decision (January 22 1990) by the City Council in Haparanda (where 65% of the population has Finnish as their mother tongue, mostly descendants of the old border minority). The Council has forbidden the staff in all day-care centres to speak anything else but Swedish when communicating with each other both in their planning work and in the children's presence; the same prohibition is planned
to be extended to the schools too. A complaint about this is being investigated by both the Ombud of Justice and the Ombud against Discrimination. Normally the negative attitudes are expressed in much more sophisticated ways (see Municio 1983, 1987 and in press for thorough analyses of some concrete cases). There is an obvious lack of correspondance between realities in Sweden for minorities and the picture which this "conscience of the world" likes to project for itself. At the same time as Sweden both actively and passively tries to prevent regular mother tongue medium education, much of the official rhetoric supports bilingualism and biculturalism for minorities.

Both Finland and Sweden are consensus-seeking societies in their general political decision-making. But consensus is reached in very different ways: in Finland often through aggressive debates, strikes etc, in Sweden often diplomatically, softly, negotiating behind closed doors, or by treating the other party as a non-party (Municio, in press), ignoring the conflict and pretending that consensus has been reached. Conflict avoidance is one of the most typical Swedish cultural traits (Daun 1984, 1989, Daun & Ehn 1988, Daun, Mattlar & Alanen 1989, Ehn & Arnstberg 1980). This makes Sweden an excellent conflict mediator internationally. It also makes it an uphill undertaking to try to analyse conflicts between the Swedish rhetoric and immigrant realities.

My question in this contribution is at a theoretical level what kind of conceptualisations of integration and ethnicity are most profitable when trying to understand the extremely covert conflicts in Sweden in relation to the future of (Finnish) immigrants. Space prevents me from doing anything else but summarising a part of a theoretical framework for looking at these questions. The framework has been applied to empirical material from a project among Finnish youngsters in mother tongue medium classes and their working class parents in Sweden (see Skutnabb-Kangas 1987 and in press, for a fuller treatment).

INTEGRATION AND ETHNICITY - CHARACTERISTICS OR RELATIONS?

How is "difference" constructed?

Principles of democracy and equality presuppose that power and resources are distributed equally between people. In order to legitimate an unequal distribution, the ones who get more have to show that the ones who get less are somehow "different" in a way which appears to demonstrate that they do not deserve a fair share. If we are interested in a more equal distribution of power and resources, it is important to understand how "differences" are constructed. "Being ethnic" and "not being integrated" are in some views characteristics which "legitimate" that individuals/groups with these "different" characteristics should have less power and resources, until they have stopped "being different", i.e. lost their ethnic traits and become integrated. If you are "different", you have to be different from something which is seen as constituting a (desirable) norm. It is only comparison which brings out a difference. The theoretical stance taken here is that differences can be more profitably understood if they are conceptually treated as socially constructed mutual relations between the definer and the defined, not as characteristics of the defined. There is nothing new in the stance itself that differences should be treated as relations. It seems to me, though, that the consequences of applying it to
concepts like ethnicity and integration have been inadequately related and applied to issues of power and control, especially soft control which uses conflict avoidance as one of the main strategies. I will show some of the consequences of defining integration and ethnicity either as characteristics or as relations.

Covertly assimilationist rhetoric, overtly assimilationist implicit assumptions

Both integration and ethnicity have in much of the earlier research literature been treated as (static, final) characteristics of a minority group or individual. The reasoning goes approximately like this: A minority group or individual goes through different phases in the process of becoming integrated. In the final phase it/she is integrated into the new society. Likewise, the minority group/individual possesses a certain ethnicity (or ethnic identity). Even when ethnic identity and integration are discussed as involving processes, and maybe never coming to a final standstill but constantly evolving, they are often seen as non-dialectic, non-reciprocal characteristics in the person/group who "has" a certain ethnicity/ethnic identity or has come so and so far in her/its one-way process of becoming integrated.

In this reasoning, it is mostly only the newcomer or the minority person/group who is seen as possessing ethnicity, and having to change and to embrace the goals, ideals and identity of the new country: be integrated into a "mainstream society". Methodologically, it has been only the newcomer's "degree of integration" and "ethnic identity" which is being discussed and assessed, not the degree of integration or the ethnic identity of the majority, i.e. the minority member/group has been the object of studies, not the majority. If the newcomer has to fit into a virtually unchanged society, this society can continue to regard itself as the mainstream. "Being in the mainstream" is thus also treated as a characteristic, a characteristic of the majority, which they somehow possess in a natural way. The majority mainstream society is seen as non-ethnic, already being there and not in need to do any integrating, because the mainstream/majority/dominant group IS itself already "integrated" in "its own" society.

This static and ethnocentric view, where the whole burden of integration is on the incomer alone, and where the dominant group's values are presented as somehow "shared" and "universal" values (see Zubrzycki's criticism, 1988) in which the minority groups have to participate (rather than particularistic and changing, like all values are), still prevails in many countries. When the majority population is presented in this way as an integrated mainstream, homogenously sharing universal cultural values, this characteristic legitimates its access to power and resources (which are, of course shared unevenly on a class and gender basis within the majority population, but this is often not mentioned in the integration discourse).

If "being integrated" is seen as a characteristic which the majority population possesses "naturally", and if this "integrated" majority is seen as non-ethnic (= only minorities are ethnics), that means that "being integrated" entails "disappearance of ethnic characteristics". This view of integration and ethnicity in fact leads to "integration" becoming synonymous with "assimilation". But this is often not apparent, because the brutally assimilationist rhetoric of earlier times is absent. Those who hold these views are not even always themselves aware of the assimilationist implications of their concepts. The rhetoric used is thus covertly assimilationist, but the implicit
assumptions are overtly assimilationist in relation to integration and ethnicity (overt because they are clear to the observer; they follow logically from the way the concepts integration and ethnicity are constructed).

If integration is seen in this way as something that only the minority group has to do and can choose to do or not to do, the minority can also be held responsible for the results, which are seen as reflecting its members' wish to integrate. Their retaining their ethnic identity and their lack of integration (which are in this view seen as their own fault) can then be used as a legitimation for the unequal division of power and resources which prevails in majority/minority relations. This is done in Sweden (and several other countries).

"There is reason to believe that some groups of immigrants will little by little integrate into the Swedish society. But a probable development is also that other groups will maintain and specifically emphasize their ethnic distinctiveness", say the Swedish State Committee Against Racism and Xenophobia in their final report (SOU 1989:13, 115, my translation). According to the Swedes, then, a group is not integrated if it maintains its ethnic distinctiveness, they have to lose it and become Swedes in order to be integrated, i.e. they have to assimilate and become non-ethnic (2).

These first phases in how integration and ethnic identity are seen, often use exo-definitions, definitions by others. It is the representatives of those "already integrated" and those who "possess no ethnicity" who are the arbiters of to what extent an immigrant (group) has integrated or still behaves as ethnic. In these phases, minority members are also mostly seen by researchers/politicians within a deficiency-based framework, as Problems (of their own making), until they have integrated/assimilated (see Skutnabb-Kangas 1988). They are seen as possessing integration-preventing characteristics which cause their problems and which they consequently have to get rid of (see Jayasuriya 1986, Skutnabb-Kangas & Cummins 1988). They are defined 1. with the majority population as a norm, and 2. negatively, in terms of what they are not, do not have or do not represent (=majority-language-speaking middle class "modern" majority members). For instance LEP- or NEP-children in the United States (Limited/No English Proficiency) or NESB students in Australia (Non-English-Speaking-Background) or "fremmedsprogde" (=foreign-speaking) in Denmark represent these definitions. The problems which minorities face are not analysed in terms of the racism, ethnocentrism and discriminatory practices of the majority society (i.e. in terms of relations between the minorities and the majority), but are seen as resulting from handicaps and deficiencies (=characteristics) in the minorities themselves.

Overtly liberal/intercultural rhetoric, covertly assimilationist implicit assumptions

Another way of seeing integration and ethnicity often follows the more crudely assimilationist views described above. Here the rhetoric is overtly liberal/intercultural whereas the implicit assumptions are covertly assimilationist vis-a-vis integration/ethnicity. Now it is overtly acknowledged that the migrant may have something to contribute, but it is the host society which decides what of it is accepted as enriching, and thus allowed to exist as part of the "mainstream" (often ethnic food, dances, clothes, etc). The rest, meaning many of the more vital non-material group-reproduction-oriented parts of minority cultures, are seen as belonging to the domain of
the private sphere. They are labelled parts of the minorities' "private ethnicity", and "public institutions" like schools should not "promote private ethnicity", because "matters of ethnicity are best left to those directly concerned", as John Edwards puts it (1984b, 299-300).

However, the same attributes are not seen as part of any private ethnicity when it comes to the majority population. Their "private ethnicity" is of course being supported by public institutions like schools. Majority language schools for majority children "naturally" maintain their language, which should logically also be seen as a private aspect of their ethnicity. This lack of consistency is a logical consequence of seeing ethnicity as something that majorities are devoid of. Therefore quotes as the following are not seen to lead to the view that the use of Danish in Danish schools, the use of English in British schools should be abolished (which they logically should): "Educational programmes aimed at sustaining ethnic identity through communicative language maintenance are misguided and may even damage those private aspects of ethnicity (i.e. language) which are essentially out of the reach of external intervention." (Edwards 1984a, 14). Perhaps a challenge to the educational language planners of integrated Europe? Abolish majority languages and cultures for majority populations completely from all European schools, because they are part of a private ethnicity, and programmes for their maintenance are misguided...

In the next phase integration is defined in a way which allows the minority to categorise itself to a larger extent, to use endo-definitions. The minority is allowed to retain what it wants of its own cultural heritage, in addition to being allowed to learn and use cultural and structural features of the host society on an equal basis, i.e. it is allowed to become structurally incorporated and bicultural. But in this more progressive atmosphere, in an intercultural phase, the host society may still not really be seen to need to change. It just lets a bilingual, bicultural migrant (group) incorporate structurally into an unchanged "mainstream" culture and structure. All these ways to construct the concepts of integration and ethnicity can be used to legitimate less access to power and resources for minority groups, which are seen as possessing the characteristic of being unintegrated because they "cling" to their original ethnic identity. At the same time integration is in them defined in a discriminatory way which forces minorities to assimilate, because no change is required in the majority population or society. Nor do these deficit theories challenge the static, ethnocentric view of majority cultures as more universalistic, and majorities as devoid of ethnicity. In thus making invisible (here unquestionable) those "characteristics", on the basis of which the majority group gets access to more power and resources, and reconstructing minorities' resources (their "differences" and their ethnicity) as handicaps, these definitions implicitly legitimate and reproduce this unequal access. They function in a racist/ethnicist/linguicist way.

Democratic/intercultural rhetoric, intercultural harmony-oriented implicit assumptions

In contrast to these definitions we will consider the definition used by Drobizheva and Gouboglo (1986): "INTEGRATION: formation of a series of common features in an ethnically heterogenous group." This definition of integration where the rhetoric is democratic/intercultural and the implicit assumption is one of intercultural harmony vis-a-vis integration/ethnicity, uses ambo-definitions. It sees integration as a process, (not a product) with several participants, all equal, regardless of size, and it sees all groups as ethnic. As an example of the use of the
definition we can consider the present changes in Europe. If an integrated Europe is to be "an ethnically heterogenous group", one implication of the definition is that majority ethnicities have to be acknowledged and made visible. All groups living in Europe must become conscious of their ethnicity and its implications (ideally also the fact that most majority ethnicities have elements of dominance...). Minorities are mostly aware of their ethnicity, possibly with the expection of migrants who come from former imperialist countries. (In Canada "the British are not considered immigrants", according to Helen Ralston (1988)). Secondly, all groups have to change, not only old or new minorities, or Eastern Europeans now entering what many Western Europeans have defined as "Europe", and everybody should have the right to contribute on an equal basis. There cannot be any kind of "mainstream Europeanness", that we "in the fringe areas" are invited to join.

But the features which the Drobizheva & Gouboglo definition talks about can still be seen as characteristics in a group, even if all participants are allowed to participate in defining the legitimate characteristics. And there is nothing in the definition to suggest that the formation of the common features might be something conflictual, something where the power relations between the different groups involved might influence the outcome. It presupposes harmonious relations where everybody is prepared to give and take on an equal basis, everybody's ethnicity is equally valued and different ethnic groups can live together in a non-problematised way. Conflicts are not discussed or conceptualised within the definition and thus harmony becomes deceptive.

Various rhetoric, intercultural conflict-oriented implicit assumptions

Barth's way of seeing boundaries between ethnicities as the focal point of ethnicity is a conceptualisation approximating a relational outlook. The essence of ethnicity is for Barth the very existence of the boundaries, not their content. But in the end, the binary oppositions used to constitute a boundary function as characteristics, even if they are constantly changing not static characteristics. Since the content of the boundaries is not important, the conflict in negotiating whose content definitions should be valid, does not become salient for Barth - both groups define the boundaries for themselves and their conceptions of the boundaries do not necessarily need to coincide. It is not a contest about whose boundaries and world views are valid.

Deirdre Jordan, building further on Barth, Berger & Luckman, and others sees the construction of ethnic identity by Aborigines in Australia as a process of theorising where the Aborigines now try to negotiate about a positive ethnic identity. The negative white-constructed identities (exo-definitions) which they have been offered in most of their earlier contacts with the colonisers, (and some of them earlier accepted them as their endo-definitions, leading to a behaviour which confirmed the negative identity) has to some extent been rejected by both groups. But still the definitions which Aborigines negotiate about in interaction with their environment (including other groups) are socially constructed in a power relationship where they are the weaker party. Jordan's analysis of the Aboriginal theorising sees ethnic identity as a relation, where the outcome depends on the power relations between the negotiating groups. Her conceptualisation of ethnicity comes very close to the one advocated here.
Fishman has seen ethnicity in terms of both characteristics and relations. Fishman's (putative) biological origins-related "paternity" concept which "the notion of ethnicity requires (as) a central concept or chord around which all others can be clustered" (1989, 24) can be seen as a characteristic, and so can "patrimony", the "behavioral or implementational or enactment system" of ethnicity (1989, 27-28). His ethnicity "is viewed as having both inner and outer characteristics and consequences, causes and effects" (1989, 6). In the same way as Barth, Fishman sees boundaries (contrast) and fully articulated opposition across boundaries as something that ethnic identity logically requires, but "there can be no boundaries unless there is a heartland", i.e. characteristics to relate to. Fishman also discusses ethnicity in relational terms in most of his articles, and recognises fully the power relations involved. However, this recognition of the complexity of ethnic relations seems to lead to an acceptance of an intellectually laudable but at the same time (politically and otherwise) frustrating stance that it is still too early to come with a comprehensive theory of ethnicity (or integration), or even a definition. This seems to lead to a certain avoidance of fully exploiting power relations as causal factors in empirical analyses.

All these conceptualisations of integration/ethnicity come with implicit assumptions of intercultural conflict vis-a-vis integration/ethnicity, even if the conflict may be abstract (between definitions) or concrete (power conflict between groups), despite using different types of rhetoric, where some stop with description, explanation and understanding, some go further to advocacy. All use ambo-definitions.

Some methodological considerations

When the migrant has to do the integrating into an unchanged "host" society, researchers only study the migrant (group), and compare with some type of statistical mean for the host population, in order to judge to what extent the migrant (group) is integrated. Deviations from the norm are seen as deficiencies to be compensated, and often subtractive changes (changes where the migrant adopts the hosts' behaviour at the expense of her own, not in addition to it) are applauded (see e.g. Just Jeppesen 1989 who has done this).

In the liberal intercultural phase, both minority and majority individuals/groups are seen as the ones to be studied. While the migrant (group) is still compared with the majority and deviations judged negatively, the majority are often compared with themselves earlier, and small deviations from earlier behaviour/attitudes are often seen as positive as long as they are additive, not subtractive.

In the democratic intercultural harmony phase, when integration is seen as socially constructed, in the same way as gender, class and ethnicity, it is somehow assumed that the negotiation of legitimate features to be included just happens more or less "naturally", as a result of a state which promotes "international understanding" between the different nationalities/ethnicities. All groups are studied, but in a way which emphasizes their equality and resources. They are in principle judged according to the same criteria, but the majority's unwillingness to change is often "glossed over" or "understood" as rational. Power conflicts are not supposed to exist and are therefore not studied. As we can see from what happens now in the Soviet Union, this implicit assumption of harmony has been to some extent false: the conflicts have been there but have not been acknowledged enough.
This is what is explicitly done in the intercultural conflict theorizing. Since the integration relation is here seen as socially created and constructed through interaction between the parties to be integrated, the conditions for this interaction should be equally important as objects of study as the actors in this intercultural conflict view. If there is unequal access to power and resources in the negotiation process, there is a risk that some features are being forcibly imposed as "universal" and "common" to all - and these are invariably features of the powerful groups. Integration has not commonly been studied in this way in empirical studies.

The same kind of development can be traced in ways of treating ethnicity. When ethnicity is seen as a characteristic of a group or a person, certain criteria are needed in order to differentiate ethnic groups from other types of groups. Allardt specifies the criteria for an ETHNIC GROUP as 1. self-categorisation (self-identification), 2. common descent ("real" or imagined), 3. specific cultural traits, for instance language, and 4. a social organisation for interaction both within the group and with people outside the group (Allardt & Starck 1981, 43). According to Allardt there are no criteria for membership in an ethnic group that would hold for all the members, but at least part of the members must fulfill all the criteria before one can speak of an ethnic group, and every member must fulfill at least one of them. Often most members fulfill all the criteria, but there is also a number of "ethnic lukewarms" and "ethnic self-haters" who do not self-categorise as members despite fulfilling all the other criteria except self-categorisation and and despite being categorised as members by others.

One problem with such situations of cognitive dissonance is that forced external categorisations, exo-categorisations which do not agree with people's own categorisations, are, according to many researchers, "experienced as an insult to basic human rights" (e.g. Liebkind 1984,19). According to a human rights oriented argumentation, it should be the right of every individual and group to have endo-categorisations, their own definitions of their ethnic group membership or their degree of integration accepted and respected by others.

On the other hand, according to Allardt, self-categorisations and other-categorisations have different logical structures. Other-categorisations imply reference to other superficial criteria (like cultural traits, language or organisation), which are part of his definition anyway, whereas self-categorisation only presupposes a wish to identify or categorise as a member of the group (but see Fishman 1989, 52, footnote 3 about the difference between ethnic self-recognition, awareness and consciousness). Therefore Allardt sees it as unnecessary to have exo-categorisations as a part of the definition, but on different grounds from the human rights-oriented argument of Liebkind and others. Fishman (1989, 6), on the other hand, sees both endo- and exo-categorisations as part of ethnicity: "Above all, ethnicity is phenomenological, i.e. it is self-perceived or attributed", and ethnicity is "an aspect of a collective self-recognition as well as an aspect of its recognition in the eyes of outsiders" (1989, 24). Even in a human rights sense ethnicity can still be seen as reified, as a characteristic of an individual or a group, who (should) themselves have the right to decide about them. But even without this orientation, the criteria for belonging to an ethnic group as outlined by Allardt above are all seen as characteristics in individuals making up that group or in the group itself.

By contrast, if ethnicity is treated as a socially constructed relation, the necessity of considering
both endo- and exo-categorisations can be motivated differently. Relations cannot be decided by one party in the relation alone, relations are to be negotiated. Ethnicity is not a characteristic that a member of an ethnic group "possesses", it is something that the individual or group must negotiate about with significant others. If ethnicity is seen in this way, as something to be negotiated, something that needs validation from both parties in order to exist, all the parties involved in the negotiation process must be taken into account when defining somebody's ethnicity. If this is so, then the power relationships between the parties in the definition process become a primary object of study, just as when studying integration, as opposed to just one of the parties, mostly the dominated one, being studied.

One consequence of this approach, in contrast to the human rights oriented demand for self-categorisation (which represents an intercultural harmony-oriented approach), is that other-categorisations have to be seen as a part of somebody's ethnic identity and thus ethnicity (as Fishman does). Self-categorisation is not enough. We can draw a parallel to a state. A state is also a relation, not a characteristic of the supposed state. It is not enough for PLO to proclaim a state (which is an act of self-categorisation). The state does not "exist" before (at least some) other states have accepted its existence, meaning exo-categorisations are needed as a validation, and thus ambo-categorisation becomes necessary.

We can see the development of the definitions in constructing ethnicity from a dialectic point of view. The thesis is the phase (which still seems to be the most common one) where the majority defines (and names) the ethnic identity and the ethnicity of the minorities, meaning only other-categorisations (and the names for an ethnic group given by others, exo-ethnonyms) are valid. This would correspond to all the assimilationist phases in studying integration. The progressive anti-thesis, represented by Allardt, Liebkind, Drobizheva and Gouboglo (but all with different arguments) is that the minority itself defines or has the right to define (and name) itself, i.e. only endo-categorisations and endo-ethnonyms (the names used by ethnic groups themselves about themselves) are valid. During both the thesis and the anti-thesis phase cognitive dissonance, conflict between endo-ethnonyms and exo-ethnonyms, is possible and often probable, but since only either one or the other categorisation is seen as valid, the conflict does not become apparent. All treat ethnicity as a characteristic of the group to be characterised and named, and all concentrate, accordingly, on a study of the group or groups involved.

The synthesis which I try to develop here, sees the ethnonym, the name by which the group is characterised, as a signifier of the power relation between the groups. Cognitive consonance can be reached and the endo- and exo-ethnonyms agree only in a situation of balanced power between the parties. In this phase it is again, as in the study of integration, the negotiation process between the parties, the conditions for negotiation, and thus the power relations between them which should become the main object of study. Ethnicity has not commonly been studied in this way either. It has mostly been studied as a characteristic of the ethnic group, with the same implications as studying integration similarly.

CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF THE DEFINER CAN PREVENT INTEGRATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ETHNIC MINORITIES

I see both a high degree of bilingual and bicultural competence and a wish to self-categorise as a
national ethnic minority group (as opposed to an immigrant group or just an ethnic group) as a prerequisite for an immigrated minority group to do its part of the integration. But the majority also has to do its part.

If a minority group persists in an interpretation of integration as a mutual process, and demands that the majority also change, an unwilling majority (as in Sweden) can either dictate terms or cease negotiating. It can revert back to (or never stop) seeing integration as a characteristic, and claim that the majority is integrated anyway, because it represents the mainstream. Thus a powerful majority may subvert the integration process, and simultaneously arrogate to itself the power to define the minority as non-integrated and itself as integrated. Research about integration should, in the view taken in this article, mainly study the structural and ideological conditions for the negotiation, including the power relationships between the actors. By concentrating the study of integration on researching the migrants/minorities and "their" characteristics, the conditions for real integration, most importantly the power of the majority to prevent integration, are neglected. Thus the concept of integration is constructed in a way which permits it to be used in legitimating new forms of racism.

The human right to self-definition makes sense only when the parties are equal, as we said. If minorities are defined on the basis of power, not numbers, minorities are per definition not equal parties in the negotiation processes about "their" ethnicities or "their" degree of integration. In the same way as in discussing integration above, the powerful party is able to prevent a migrant minority group from constructing itself as a national ethnic minority, by refusing to do "its" (i.e. the majority's) part in the validation process. In relation to itself, the majority can refuse to change. In relation to the minority, the majority can in the first place prevent the minority from acquiring the bilingual, bicultural competence needed as a prerequisite for integration. This is what Sweden does when organising minority education so that it leads to linguistic and cultural assimilation (which is what Swedish medium classes do - see e.g. Boyd 1985). Secondly, if a migrant minority group struggles to get this competence anyway and then feels ready to integrate and wants to change its ethnic identification from Xish (e.g. Finnish) to an ambo-categorisation, often a hyphenated term (e.g. Sweden-Finn), the majority can refuse to accept the new categorisation as a positive categorisation and can redefine it in negative, deficiency-based terms. This is also what Sweden does. It seems on the basis of my empirical study (Skutnabb-Kangas 1987, in press a,b,c) that identifying as anything that contains "Finnish" is not interpreted by Swedes as a positive endoethnonym, denoting a valued ethnic minority identity, but as a linguonym.

As a linguonym, "Finnish" should, of course, denote a (positive) capacity to speak Finnish. But according to monolingual norms, a capacity to speak a marked language (and all non-majority languages are marked in a monolingually oriented society) is also, or even mainly, taken as indicative of the possibility that one is NOT able to speak the unmarked majority language. The linguonym is not interpreted in a positive way, in line with enrichment theories, as denoting a positive competence in an additional language. It is interpreted negatively, according to a deficiency-theoretical interpretation, where "Finnish" stands for "lack of competence in Swedish". This is how the deficiency hypothesis (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Leporanta-Morley 1988) is operationalised vis-a-vis language: being able to speak language amnX is not taken to indicate a CAPACITY, a competence, but rather a suspicion of LACK OF CAPACITY to speak
language Y. As long as the Swedes do not accept "Finnish" as a positive official (as opposed to private: "home language") ethnonym which does not mean being less loyal to Sweden, and as long as "Swedish" is an exclusive and unmarked ethnonym, Sweden cannot have national ethnic minority groups, regardless of how ready for this and for integration these groups are. When reminding ourselves of the fact that Swedish racism towards the inhabitants of Finland, its colony for 650 years, had to use language as the main basis for dividing groups to be given unequal access to power and resources (because there were few biological differences like skin colour), it also becomes more understandable that Swedish racism and ethnicism from so early on has crystallised in LINGUICISM ("ideologies, structures and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and (both material and non-material) resources between groups which are defined on the basis of language" - Skutnabb-Kangas 1988). One strategy in linguicism is to restrict an ethnonym so that it becomes a linguonym only, and then to redefine the linguonym in a de