EXAMPLES OF LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE MAKING

We shall set the scene for this study of language policy issues and triumphalist English by some brief examples which demonstrate the salience of language policy issues in the contemporary world. The exemplification has mainly a European focus, but comparable language policy issues could have been chosen virtually anywhere in the world.

In "international" activities there is a pecking order of languages, with English with much the sharpest beak, for a variety of reasons, political, economic and cultural. 18 states warned in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations (reported in *The Guardian*, 27 July 1995) against the "tendency to accept a virtually monolingual United Nations", meaning English as the dominant language of UN bodies. They demanded that the 50th Annual Session of the General Assembly in September 1995 place on its agenda the issue of multilingualism1. However, in this context, "multilingualism" only means equal rights for the six official languages of the UN (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish) and interpretation and translation between them. The countries behind the UN complaint were in fact mainly the "francophone" countries, which presumably wish French to be as widely used as English. Other languages than the six have no rights, which puts their speakers at a disadvantage, as an interpreter from within the UN system has documented (Piron 1994), and as a scholar from Japan has criticised in a study of the dominance of English, in which he quotes an eminent Japanese journalist as stating that

Americans take it for granted that foreigners should speak English. That is linguistic imperialism and Americans should give up that idea. I believe Americans respect fairness, but as far as language is concerned, they are not fair. For example, the U.S. Ambassador has never held a press conference in Japanese. (Tsuda 1994, 59).

In the 15 member states of the *European Union*, language learning is ascribed a central role in promoting European integration and intercultural understanding. In 1995 the French government
failed to persuade its EU partners to adopt a "Languages Pact" that would have committed governments to the principle of all European schoolchildren learning two foreign languages, and to a diversification of the languages learned. Recent years have seen an intensification of contacts at many levels between EU member countries, and major programmes designed to promote student and teacher mobility, and foreign language learning. However, in the supranational institutions of the EU, the European Parliament in Strasbourg, and the European Commission, the EU’s administrative headquarters in Brussels, the "multilingual principle" refers to the formal equality of eleven languages as official and working languages. These are Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. Other languages have no rights, even if they have many speakers (e.g. Catalan, more than 6 million). The multilingual principle also ignores the fact that in practice some languages are more equal than others, in particular French and English (in different ways and for different reasons). Native speakers of languages other than the dominant languages are at a disadvantage, as the German government has pointed out to the EU on several occasions (Volz 1994). Likewise, German scholars have complained that the obligation to publish or address conferences in English puts them at an unfair disadvantage (Ammon 1989). How the hierarchies of language, official, international, indigenous, and minority languages, "national" and immigrated, will be worked through in contemporary Europe in the coming years is an open question.

In post-communist states, English is being vigorously promoted as the royal road to democracy, a market economy and human rights. The British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, proclaimed that English should become the first foreign language throughout Europe, the lingua franca of the changed economic and political circumstances. The claims of competing dominant languages are pressed with equivalent rhetoric, particularly French, and substantial resources. German is traditionally a widespread lingua franca in eastern and central Europe and is still widely used in cross-border regional collaboration (Geller-Novak 1994) and learned in schools (e.g. in Hungary, Radnai 1994). In the wake of the rejection of an ideology, communism, and a language, Russian, major language policy decisions are needed on what languages can lead to the evolution of more democratic societies, and on how some of the promises and expectations, material and spiritual, that are associated with languages that represent success, English in particular, can be redeemed.

That the promotion of English is not a purely altruistic matter of assisting former victims of communism towards democracy and human rights can be seen in the thrust of the "English 2000" project, launched by Prince Charles for the British Council in early 1995. The press pack associated with this media event (which the noble Prince sidetracked by a gratuitous attack on the corruptions of American English, see The Times, 24 March 1995) declares that the aims of English 2000 are "to exploit the position of English to further British interests" as one aspect of maintaining and expanding the "role of English as the world language into the next century". Fundamental ambivalence about whose interests are served by an increased use of English can be seen in the project description: "The English language is in the full sense international: it is divesting itself of its political and cultural connotations. Speaking English makes people open to Britain's cultural achievements, social values and business aims."

The fascinating open agenda and unclear contours of the European language map have attracted the attention of scholars. Thus the 1994 number of Sociolinguística, the International Yearbook of European Sociolinguistics (for which reading competence in English, French and German is necessary), brings together articles by scholars from seven countries on the theme of "English
only? in Europe”. A Canadian sociolinguist has written a monograph on EU language policy and how EU institutions manage their multilingualism (Labrie 1993). Joshua Fishman has pinpointed some of the dimensions (1994a) and impressionistically charted the complexity of the European language map, which leads him to the provisional conclusion that “English can and will continue to be a mighty force in Europe even without becoming a dominant or domineering one” (Fishman 1994b, 71). Others are less cautious and, after a cursory inspection, and without careful clarification of concepts, adopt a triumphalist stance:

.. it is, in my view, likely that English will become the primary language of the citizens of the EC. Whether or not it is ever officially declared as such, it will be even more widely used as a vehicle for intra-European communication across all social groups. (Berns 1995, 9).

**PRINCIPLES OF LANGUAGE POLICY**

The contours of language policy as a scientifically explicit and theoretically based concern need to be delineated more thoroughly and clearly. This is particularly important if scholars are to contribute to the clarification, let alone the solution of salient language policy problems, national and international. Hierarchies of language substantially influence social reproduction and intercultural communication in a world characterized by the contradictory pressures of vigorous ethnolinguistic identities and strong global homogenizing tendencies. It is important therefore to assess how language policy is formulated, and what role language professionals play in the linguistic market place.

Many types of language policy issue are in evidence. There are the familiar issues in education of how schooling leading to high levels of bi- or multilingualism can best be organized, both for minority and dominant groups. Also prominent is the learning of "international" foreign languages when this is seen as being in the national interest, often primarily for economic reasons. There are also language policy issues in broader sociopolitical domains - the maintenance of indigenous cultures, the promotion of language rights, and choice of "national" and official languages in contemporary states, the *de facto* multilingualism of which is increasingly recognized. Language policy is therefore a barometer of identities at the sub-national, national and supra-national levels, and of how languages and identities are encouraged or subdued in education systems and in society at large.

Language policy issues are invariably entangled with non-linguistic matters, ranging from military collaboration or peace-keeping (e.g. the UN or NATO in Bosnia, Jordan or Somalia) through commercial transactions (much trade being transnational) to the media (where the massive flow of products from California worldwide contrasts with a mere trickle in the reverse direction). In virtually all these relations, economic, cultural and linguistic, there is a lack of symmetry. A further characteristic is interlocking national and international pressures and influences.

It is also likely that the bargaining in the linguistic market place is asymmetrical in that the case for dominant languages is put constantly and reinforced in myriad ways, most of them covert hegemonic processes, whereas alternative linguistic hierarchies are seldom considered and tend to be regarded as counter-intuitive and in conflict with a common sensical, "natural" order of things.

It would be important for language professionals to consider how to promote a better
understanding of language policy issues among politicians and bureaucrats. In very few countries has there been a coalescence of political and academic interests such as took place in Australia over a period of years leading up to the National Policy on Languages (Lo Bianco 1987, 1990), or the more limited fusion of interests in the Netherlands, in the business, political and academic worlds, leading to the Dutch National Action Programme on Foreign Languages (van Els 1992). Language policy tends to be made piecemeal and ad hoc. In the foreword to a recent volume of papers on "Language education in the national curriculum" in Great Britain, Stubbs (1995) states that there is a lack of coherent language policy: "Indeed, it is doubtful if the Ministers involved could make much sense of the concept of 'language policy'". This is so, despite a flurry of official reports (26 are listed for the period 1975-1993, Brumfit 1995, xiii-xvi) on various aspects of English learning, foreign language learning, language awareness, drama, etc, in the British national curriculum.

In addition to such domestic policy work, the authorities in all fifteen member states of the European Union are involved in a great deal of supranational activity, for which language is not only the medium but also a central concern (choice of official and working languages in supranational institutions, and in regulating all manner of communications with citizens). Since the Maastricht treaty of 1993, culture and education figure more prominently in the European integration process, along with economies and political links, and collaboration in atomic energy.

In the EU, explicit language policy formulations are relatively rare (Labrie 1993, Baetens Beardsmore 1994), which does not mean that there is no language policy. On the contrary, there are competing policies at the national and supranational levels. Even within official rhetoric, there is an inconsistency between cultural and economic homogenization and unification on the one hand, and a declared principle of respect for the distinctive cultural and linguistic heritage of the diverse member states on the other. Both dimensions are regarded as central to European identity (Baetens Beardsmore 1993).

Exploring language policy issues is demanding because of the sociolinguistic diversity in each context, the intermeshing of language policy with broader social structures and goals, and because of the prevalence of fuzzy concepts and strategies. There is a need for a conceptual framework for comparative language policy analysis which goes beyond consideration of language in a few domains, and that permits valid comparison of fundamentally different sociopolitical units. It seems to us that this is precisely the challenge of language policy as an explicit concern. There is a substantial amount of documentation and description of language policy, and of language dominance, but our impression is that relatively little effort has gone into clarifying how language policy can be approached in a more rigorous, inter-disciplinary way, although there are significant approaches within political science, the sociology of language, and economics and language. iv

In applied linguistics the contours of a more systematic approach to language policy are becoming visible. The 1994 Annual Review of Applied Linguistics is devoted to language policy and planning, but few of the papers are theoretically explicit and the volume is very uneven. The overview article by the editor suggests that applied linguistics has expanded so as to take policy decisions on board in at least the following areas or dimensions:

1) by recognizing the de facto multilingualism of our contexts;
2) by realizing that it is inherently political;
3) it operates at several levels, the pan-national, national and sub-national;
4) education is central;
5) it involves sociolinguistic concerns such as language maintenance, shift and death, and
minority rights;
6) it is predictive as well as descriptive;
7) the relationship between policy and planning needs clarification (Grabe 1994, viii).
We cannot do more here than point out that there are unsolved problems in theorizing language policy, and provisionally attempt to clarify what we regard as being covered by some central concepts.

*Language planning* conventionally consists of corpus, status and acquisition planning. Language planning is necessary in a multidialectal and multilingual world, and reflects political and economic choices and the value judgements of the planners.

*Language legislation* is the regulations at state and sub-state level which specify the implementation of language policy. The European Union has *supra-statual* rules for the choice and functioning of official languages, for working languages, for language requirements in employment, language use in commercial transactions, products, and the media (Labrie 1993). States that ratify UN human rights charters and covenants are supposed to ensure that domestic law conforms to the principles in the documents. In *state* education it is governments that decide on choice of language as medium of instruction, sometimes delegating this to a regional authority.

*Language policy* is a broad over-arching term for decisions on rights and access to language and on the roles and functions of particular languages and varieties of language in a given polity. Such policies, and the decisions that underpin them, may be more or less overt or covert. Not providing for the implementation of a policy is mere posturing, Khubchandani’s term for much language policy in India (private communication). Davis 1994 distinguishes between language policy intent, implementation and experience. Language policy is concerned with language matters at the collective level, whether statal, supra-statual or sub-statual. Language policy is a super-ordinate category, within which fall operational concerns such as language planning and, as one form of normative regulation, language legislation. Both of these exemplify the more centralistic, government-induced or government-controlled aspects of language policy. Language policies in such domains as business, tourism, the mass media and entertainment (each of which may be statal, supra-statual or sub-statual) are at least partially government-external, and may be overt or, as is more often the case, covert. Language policy is guided by overall policy concerns such as appropriate educational policy or the facilitation of democratic citizenship. Ideally it is guided by a will to respect linguistic diversity and the linguistic human rights of all, at both individual and collective levels. The formulation and implementation of policies which respect linguistic human rights (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a) presupposes a recognition of the reality of linguistic hierarchies and the need to mitigate these. Thus addressing the reality of the power relations between users of different languages is a necessary prerequisite for language policy to go beyond posturing.

The focus in language policy studies on the collective level implies a concern with social structure and power. This is the framework within which individuals or families operate and can attempt to maximize language maintenance (inter-generational continuity being of decisive importance, Fishman 1991) and language learning at the individual and group level.

**THE DIFFUSION OF ENGLISH PARADIGM**

The Japanese communication scholar, Yukio Tsuda, posits two global contemporary language
policy options, a "diffusion of English paradigm" and an "ecology of language paradigm". Tsuda sees the paradigms as characterized by the following (1994: 49-61, our lettering and numbering):

**Diffusion of English Paradigm**
A. - capitalism  
B. - science and technology  
C. - modernization  
D. - monolingualism  
E. - ideological globalization and internationalization  
F. - transnationalization  
G. - Americanization and homogenization of world culture  
H. - linguistic, cultural and media imperialism

**Ecology of Language Paradigm**
1. - a human rights perspective  
2. - equality in communication  
3. - multilingualism  
4. - maintenance of languages and cultures  
5. - protection of national sovereignties  
6. - promotion of foreign language education.

The two paradigms can be regarded as end points on a continuum. Language policy initiatives can thus be seen as attempts to shift the political or educational ground towards one end (e.g. English Only in the US, English as the sole European lingua franca - Diffusion of English) or the other (e.g. the multilingual principle in the European Union, minority language rights - Ecology of Language). The characteristics listed are not binary oppositions, the presence of one of which excludes a corresponding feature in the other, but rather a bundle of features and tendencies that are manifest in the structures and processes supporting either the diffusion and domination of English or the ecology of language.

A language policy is basically monolingual (Tsuda's D) when there is a linguisitc allocation of resources primarily to one language and a corresponding idolization and glorification of this dominant language and demonization, stigmatization and invisibilization of other languages, along with a rationalization of the relationship between dominant and dominated, always to the advantage of the dominant. Linguicism is defined as "ideologies, structures and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language" (Skutnabb-Kangas 1988). This has been the dominant paradigm in the past two centuries, with nation states positing the notion of a close fit between the state and a single language (French, German, Indonesian, Turkish, ...). Monolingualism has a long pedigree, in Europe deriving from Judaeo-Christian ancestors and the book of Genesis (XI, 6):

And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language ... and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.

This could be paraphrased in contemporary professional language as
God decreed that we are all citizens of one nation state and monolingual... if you accept this constraint, there will be no limits to your communicative and socio-cultural competence.

This was Jehovah's image of the monolingual world before the curse of Babel was inflicted on the peoples of the world. We now know, of course, that the Babel myth of the origins of language is incorrect, as the socio-historical and biological evidence is that languages evolved in a multitude of cultures to respond to a variety of interactional needs. The myth is though still widely but erroneously believed in, with monolingualism regarded as normal and language contact as a source of conflict (Skutnabb-Kangas, in press).

The Diffusion of English Paradigm is a convenient label for many of the key developments affecting language policy within the dominant paradigm. English is the language that has been more triumphant than its rivals, though it may be successfully challenged by these (e.g. Chinese, Arabic, German) in the coming century. What is indisputable is that English has spread worldwide in conjunction with a capitalist economic system (Tsuda's A) and the science and technology associated with it (B). The monolingualism (D) that Spanish, French and English speakers attempted to impose in their spheres of influence has had devastating effects on the languages and cultures of other parts of the world, in processes of internal and external colonialism. In the ensuing postcolonialist phase, "modernization" (C) was marketed as the key to the future of economies and cultures that were seen as being in need of this and "development", along with the western belief that states optimally operate with a single national language. Language policy was not left to chance, neither in colonial times (Calvet 1974, Heath 1972), nor in the postcolonial period (Phillipson 1992).

We are currently in a phase of the "internationalization" (E) of commerce, entertainment, communications, and many domains of public, professional and private activity. UN bodies and supranational alliances are now more prominent. On the heels of European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) agreement has been implemented, without the language policy dimensions being thought through, except in attempts by Quebeckers to at least raise the issue (Labrie 1995). In Asia, comparable international trading links are being formed. A major thrust of language policy in Australia is to promote the learning of Asian languages of geopolitical and economic importance, particularly Japanese and Indonesian. This perceived economic prerogative is influential, even though Australia currently has a balance of payments surplus with its partners in Asia, and Australian businesses would be happy to continue exporting and importing through the medium of English.

These symptoms of "internationalization" reflect changes in economic patterns in the postcolonial, postnational and post-Cold War world, but there is nothing new about a focus on economics. Whereas French was for a couple of centuries actively construed as the language of reason, human rights and logic (ce qui n'est pas clair, n'est pas français), from the 1950s, when colonial empires were being converted into a different type of North-South relationship, French was promoted because, as official discourse then put it, "là ou on parle français, on achète français". Exactly the same with British diplomacy, which was increasingly geared from the 1960s into an instrument of economic promotion. English is seen as a major economic asset:

The English language is fundamental to Britain's export-led recovery. It makes it possible for British companies to develop markets, sell into them and form commercial alliances. (British Council press pack at the launch of English 2000, March 1995).
It therefore makes economic sense for the "English-speaking" countries to attempt to make as much of the world as possible "English-speaking". For this it is important to facilitate the learning of the language by those unfortunate enough to have been born with another language as their mother tongue. Which is where TESOL comes in. English for business is business for English, big business for the British economy, for publishers, language schools, teachers, experts, professional associations et al. TESOL’s logo represents TESOL spanning the globe. Its publicity covers job opportunities worldwide, just as the London-based EL Gazette claims that it "opens doors across the world" and documents "the key role the English language and its teaching industry has to play in providing a link between disparate nations" (editorial, July 1995). It is revealing that what many would regard as a liberal profession is projected as an "industry". The professionalism that most of us imbibed in our training was unduly narrow, as TESOL luminaries are increasingly admitting. The foreword to the Annual Review of Applied Linguistics on "Language policy and planning" (LPP), 1993/94, records the failure of applied linguistics prior to the 1990s to address the social and political contexts of its operations and the fact of "the inherently political nature of LPP", both in its formation and implementation (Grabe 1994, viii). The socio-political and ethical dimensions of English teaching and language policy are in fact increasingly being addressed (Kachru 1993, Pennycook 1994, Phillipson 1992, Tollefson 1991, 1995, the thematic number of Issues in Applied Linguistics, vol.4, no.2, 1993), and TESOL has encouraged this process through the activities of its Socio-Political Concerns Committee. However, the unclear nature of the "internationalism" of TESOL is manifest in the organization's "vision statement" on this topic, reported in Nunan 1995, which looks like new missionary wine in old bottles. Kaplan, in an astonishing confession that he has been wrong earlier in advocating that TESOL should avoid taking political stances, specifically recommends caution internationally:

If the membership, which lives and works largely in the US, cannot begin to meet its objectives domestically, to what extent can it hope to play a significant role in its international member organizations, in the internal affairs of other states, and in the face of recalcitrant government establishments? (Kaplan 1995, 16).

One place where there has been major resistance and resentment is Japan, in particular on the issue of a language teachers' association functioning in English only (Oda 1994). Concepts such as "international language" and "world language" need to be deconstructed, just as we need to scrutinize and critically analyse all language policy issues. If we live in a world characterized by ideological globalization (F), transnationalization, Americanization, and the homogenization of world culture (G) (Pax Anglica?), does English serve the interests of all the world's citizens? Granted that English is the dominant language of the UN, the principal language of the dominant world power, the USA, and of elites in many other countries worldwide, of the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and many other "world" policy organizations, it is the language in which the fate of most of the world's citizens is decided, directly or indirectly. If "English as a world language" is expanding, is this compatible with the promotion and protection of the human rights of all, and what sorts of role does English play as a "world" language?

We are not suggesting that there are simple answers to such questions, nor that there is a straightforward correlation between global injustice in North-South relations, and English as the dominant world language and a range of uses to which English is put internationally and
intranationally. There are major complexities in the relationship between global homogenization and heterogenization, and the intermeshing of economic and cultural forces (Appadurai 1990). However, we need as people concerned with language matters to consider how and why English is expanding worldwide, whose interests this process has served, and what ideologies and structures currently favour the increased expansion of English, and what the implications are for other languages. We need increased sensitivity to diverse language policy measures, and to the potential of a range of educational language policy measures, particularly in formal schooling. We need to know whose agenda we are following, both as intellectuals (Said 1994) and as teachers responsible for the educational development of fellow humans.

**Linguistic imperialism**

Whether triumphant English is evidence of linguistic, cultural and media imperialism (Tsuda's final point in the Diffusion of English paradigm, H) is an empirical question that can be answered if the concepts are sufficiently clearly defined and adequate evidence analysed. Linguistic imperialism has tended to be described by those who have been at the receiving end, Africans, Indians and non-English speaking Europeans. In recent years, more theoretically based analyses are emerging in several parts of the world:

The Ghanaian sociolinguist, Gilbert Ansre, describes linguistic imperialism as:

The phenomenon in which the minds and lives of the speakers of a language are dominated by another language to the point where they believe that they can and should use only that foreign language when it comes to transactions dealing with the more advanced aspects of life such as education, philosophy, literature, governments, the administration of justice, etc... Linguistic imperialism has a subtle way of warping the minds, attitudes and aspirations of even the most noble in a society and of preventing him from appreciating and realizing the full potentialities of the indigenous languages. (Ansre 1979, 12-13).

Mühlhäusler has studied patterns of language dominance in Australasia and Asia:

Linguistic imperialism is the expansion of a small number of languages at the cost of a large number of others. Linguistic imperialism is a promoter of one-way learning, the flow of knowledge and information from the powerful to the powerless. (Mühlhäusler 1994, 122).

The Japanese suffer from

an 'Angloholic consciousness of an uncritical and unconditional admiration for English and Western culture, while developing a very negative image of their own language and culture”, the position of English as the most dominant international language preventing the linguistic and cultural self-determination of the speakers of other languages (Tsuda 1992, 32).

In our approach, imperialism is conceptualized as a structural relationship whereby one society or collectivity can dominate another. The key mechanisms are exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalization. Linguistic imperialism is a sub-type of cultural imperialism, along with media, educational and scientific imperialism (Phillipson 1992).
**imperialism** is seen as a form of linguicism and can be defined as the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages. **Structural** refers broadly to material properties (for example institutions, financial allocations), **cultural** to immaterial or ideological properties (for instance, attitudes, pedagogical principles).

Asymmetrical exploitation involves language learning and language use being subtractive rather than additive, for instance when competence in a dominant language entails the marginalization and loss of others.

A central aspect of English linguistic imperialism is how the language is taught. In the TESOL profession in its formative years a number of **key tenets** evolved:
- English is best taught monolingually,
- the ideal teacher of English is a native speaker,
- the earlier English is introduced, the better the results,
- the more English is taught, the better the results,
- if other languages are used much, standards of English will drop.

Adhering to these tenets has had major consequences, structural and ideological, for the entire ESL "aid" operation in post-colonial education systems. Close scrutiny, in the light of the knowledge now available to us, indicates that the tenets are all false (see Phillipson 1992, chapter 7, a detailed study of the genesis of the tenets and their validity). They can be more appropriately labelled as
- the monolingual fallacy,
- the native speaker fallacy,
- the early start fallacy,
- the maximum exposure fallacy,
- the subtractive fallacy.

They are in conflict with the scientific evidence on the role of L1 in L2 learning, even though an understanding of these issues underpinned the seminal UNESCO report of 1953 on the use of the vernacular languages in education. They represent a misunderstanding of the nature of bilingualism and cognitive development, rooted as they are in a monolingual world view. They are highly functional in making the "world" dependent on native speaker norms, expertise, textbooks and methodologies, even though these are unlikely to be culturally, linguistically or pedagogically appropriate.

They have contributed to linguicist policies in resource allocation, to language policies which have perpetuated the neglect of African and Asian languages, and to the underpinning of linguistic imperialism as one element of global dominance of the South by the North. They are thus a pillarstone of global linguistic hegemony, and conform to the classic pattern of hegemonic structures and ideologies in being complex and largely covert, so that their nature and function and the injustice they entail are often unnoticed and uncontested.

**TESOL in some European scenarios**

While there are obviously major differences between western European countries, former communist countries, and the former colonies which were at the receiving end of TESOL tenets, there are more similarities between former colonies and former communist countries than one might expect: acute economic and social problems, unequal terms of trade with the west/North,
and investment and aid being made conditional on vaguely defined principles of "democracy" and respect for human rights (mainly the civil and political ones, Tomaševski 1993). It is therefore important to attempt to see in what way any TESOL mission to Europe fits into some possible language policy scenarios. We cannot do more here than adumbrate a few parameters that might be explored in future studies.

The linguistic market-place is at the play of market forces unless active measures are taken to achieve specific language policy goals. In Europe it does not appear that many countries have attempted to draw up comprehensive language policy plans. A report for the EU's LINGUA office by an independent consultant on the current state of foreign language teaching and the impact of EU initiatives sees foreign language learning as a key measure for Europeanisation, but assesses that "most Member States have not yet reached the position of defining their own strategy for languages in a coherent form" (Savage 1994: 11). This confirms the analysis quoted earlier about language policy in Britain. Former communist countries such as the Baltic states and Hungary, have engaged in a good deal of language policy work, but are in a difficult transition phase, with many constraints on their freedom of movement.

One factor influencing the formation of language policy in present-day Europe is the awareness of decision-makers of their own limited competence in foreign languages and the lack of success of school foreign language learning. The summary of the annual report of the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie for 1994 comments on the worldwide crisis in education, and describes the teaching of languages as "a planetary defeat that needs to be remedied". A report for the EU's LINGUA bureau states that foreign language learning can be seen as "the Community's Achilles heel" (Savage 1994: 12). It is unlikely that such a verdict would emanate from one of the smaller EU countries (the Netherlands, Scandinavia), where people are relatively more successful as foreign language learners and users.

Trim, policy adviser to the Council of Europe Modern Languages Project (which has promoted reformist measures such as communicative language learning, threshold levels, and learner autonomy), in a review of the European foreign language learning scene (1994), refers to the dead hand of the status quo impeding reform of foreign language learning. He suggests that the valuing of foreign language proficiency is closely associated with trade patterns: exports and imports from European countries represent a vastly higher proportion of their GDP, as compared with the US or Japan. Also significant are the size of the country, smallness encouraging L2 learning, particularly if the L1 is not spoken elsewhere (Finland, Hungary,...), largeness often implying a perception of linguistic self-sufficiency (France, Britain, ...). Trim also points out that in some countries (Finland, Belgium, Switzerland) the language of another group within the state is learned as well as "foreign" languages, this clearly being in the "national" interest, with possible international spin-offs, because the language is also used elsewhere (German is spoken in several states, for instance, and learning Swedish, one of the two official languages in Finland, gives Finnish-speakers a solid base for Nordic cooperation with not only Sweden but the linguistically related Norway and Denmark as well). Other factors that influence national language policies, explicitly or implicitly, are changing teaching paradigms, goals, and diversity in how different education systems dispense these; communications changes, which have eroded national constraints on foreign travel, and opened up mass tourism; multinational industries, satellite TV, youth culture; the appeal of particular cultures (stereotypes about France, Spain, ...); external political relations; near neighbours; and the languages of migrants, which may compete as "foreign" languages.

There is evidence in western and eastern Europe that diglossia, with English as the intrusive
dominant language, may be imminent. If the state language is construed or presented as being unable to function adequately for certain purposes, for instance as the medium for higher education, or as the in-house language in commercial enterprises aiming at the export market, it is arguable that linguicist structures and ideologies will gradually result in the spread of the dominant "international" language, in a diglossic division of labour which marginalizes the state language. There are trends of this sort in Scandinavia, the implications of which have been little explored (but see Haberland et al 1991), and in former communist states. Essentially the issue is whether the situation is subtractive or additive. For a diglossic division of labour of this sort to be realized presupposes that English (or just possibly one of its rivals) remains the dominant foreign language in schools. It is this hierarchy of foreign languages that the French were attempting to counteract with the Languages Pact referred to earlier. Former communist countries are generally deficient in the supply of well qualified teachers of English, and may be in a better position to ensure that a diversified range of languages is learned in schools.

In contrast to virtually all African ex-colonial countries, most of the eastern and central European countries have long-established and well-developed official languages, and extensive experience of foreign language teaching and learning in formal education (though apparently this was often unsuccessful when Russian was the target language, when motivation was low). The marketing of English is often linked to professional skills (classroom management, modern methods, multimedia teaching materials, etc.), but it seems more than unlikely that young ESL teachers from Britain and the USA are culturally or linguistically qualified to take on major responsibilities in eastern or central European education systems.

On the other hand, because of the miserable economic plight of most post-communist countries, and the shortage of local people qualified to teach English, it is likely that there is a substantial temptation to accept well-intentioned offers from the West and the chance of getting "something for nothing". This however was exactly the position of many underdeveloped countries, where western "aid" in language in education has had disastrous effects (Phillipson 1992, and many references in this to work by scholars from underdeveloped countries, particularly Kachru, Ngũgĩ and Pattanayak). Here the lure of linguicist arguments for English and a legacy of linguistic imperialism was too strong. It has continued virtually uninterrupted.

As a monolingual approach is the hallmark of Anglo-American English teaching, both in its internal variants and its export version, its inappropriacy may be apparent to central and eastern Europeans. Here the long history of foreign language teaching in schools builds on the principle that the teacher of a foreign language generally has the same mother tongue as the students and has gone through the process of learning the foreign language in question herself. This is also the pattern in "small" European countries, e.g. the Nordic countries, where foreign language learning is relatively successful, and in the "big" ones such as France and Great Britain, where results are more patchy. This "bilingual" tradition may be seen as an essential foundation for a reinvigorated and redirected language teaching in many post-communist countries, supported by locally produced teaching materials in addition to "authentic" British or American ones.

Again, economic constraints may lead to departures from this norm. If so, it would be extremely important to appreciate that under-qualified native speakers may be a bad bargain, and that they are being marketed for spurious reasons. Among the demands that might be required for functioning as a foreign language teacher might be proof not merely of insight into linguistic structure (of source and target languages) and culturally appropriate pedagogy, but also a proven capacity for foreign language learning to a high level of proficiency.

There is currently a good deal of imaginative educational experimentation in foreign language
learning in Europe. Many member states of the Council of Europe are providing for the learning of at least two foreign languages. There has been an increase in the number and type of bi- or multilingual schools (Baetens Beardsmore 1993, *Sociolinguistica* 7, 1993, Skutnabb-Kangas 1995), and in scattered efforts to establish the presence of immigrant minority languages on the "mainstream" school curriculum. Innovation is increasingly based on the principle that different groups have different points of departure and needs, so that there must be different educational routes and strategies to reach the goal of high-level multilingualism (Skutnabb-Kangas & García 1995). But what the successful experiments have in common is that they all regard bilingual teachers as a *sine qua non*. This is true of immersion programmes for majority children (see e.g. Duff 1991 for English immersion in secondary schools in Hungary), of European Community Schools (e.g. Baetens Beardsmore 1992, 1993, 1995), of maintenance programmes for minority children (e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas 1984, 1990), and of two-way programmes (e.g. Dolson & Lindholm 1995). It is perhaps therefore unlikely that methods that only suit monolingual English teachers would gain ground.

These observations on the limitations of mainstream TESOL in relation to the expanding European "market" would need to be incorporated into much broader analyses of educational and language policy goals in particular contexts. Some possible contours that such a study might involve can be identified by considering the experience of managing language policy in Australia (for a more detailed study of the relevance of this for Europe, see Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas in press).

**Inspiration from language policy in Australia**

The process of initiating work on a language policy at the national or state level may be set in motion by a sense of injustice and crisis, as in Canada, or by processes of redefinition of national and supranational identities, as in contemporary Europe. In Australia it was a logical outcome of a rights and equality orientation in the 1970s and later multiculturalism, and an awareness of changing Australian collective identities. Lo Bianco, the principal architect of Australia's language policy, stresses the mix of social, political and social psychological elements in a process beginning with a language-related group consciousness, and the demonstrable crystallisation of language problems (1990, 67-73). This involved a complex process of forming alliances across groups and creating shared interests, ultimately generating a new political discourse, a rhetoric of "national interest" and good citizenship which could reassure the established order while articulating a case for change.

Lo Bianco states (1990, 77) that a policy must blend together what is 1) intellectually defensible, 2) realistically feasible, 3) equitable to all groups, and 4) in the national interest in that it meets the linguistic needs and opportunities of the mainstream sections of the society. The social goals of the Australian language policy relate to the four E's: *equality, economics, enrichment and external* (Lo Bianco 1990). *Equality* refers to the correlation between language on the one hand and social and economic equality or lack of it on the other. Language policy must serve to correct any systematic injustice, to achieve broadly egalitarian goals. The *economic* goal has to do with multilingualism as a productive asset. The *enrichment* goal draws on arguments for the cognitive, educational and cultural benefits deriving from multilingualism. The *external* goals bring in the geopolitical situation of the country, development cooperation, the transfer of technology and supporting bi- and multilateral relations with other countries.
The goals of the official Australian language policy include a language other than English for all Australians. Implementation of the policy has led to a major effort in a number of spheres, particularly ESL, cross-cultural training, adult literacy, testing, second/foreign language learning, and Asian studies. Some support also goes to Aboriginal languages. The volume of these activities, and the dynamism they represent, is impressive (see the quarterly Australian Language Matters), but there are major contradictions and challenges (Lo Bianco 1994): does an avowedly multiculturalist policy involve a multilingual education system? How do particular language-in-education policies relate to perceived economic prerogatives? Can the various constituencies and competing ideologies underlying the language policy be reconciled?

It is difficult to assess how successful the activities are in promoting the goals of the policy, and it would not be fair to expect major change within a short span of time. On paper the Australian achievement represents a significant advance for those who value bilingualism not only for minorities but also for the linguistically dominant group. Whether language policy implementation will achieve the vision of a more balanced relationship between English and the many European and Asian languages with a strong presence in Australia, only time can tell. The same uncertainty holds for the future of Aboriginal languages. The Australian language policy experience represents a departure from a Diffusion of English paradigm, but one that many decision-makers have been reluctant to endorse, as fitful follow-up has demonstrated. It has certainly contributed to a higher degree of public awareness about language issues than in most other countries. It can usefully contribute to clarifying an Ecology of Language paradigm.

THE ECOLOGY OF LANGUAGE PARADIGM

It is probable that everyone can agree that a human rights perspective (Tsuda's 1), an equity perspective, should be an integral part of any language policy, just as the policy should lead to greater enjoyment of all human rights. It is therefore somewhat ironic that when pressing the case for their language, both the British and the French, countries with a long history of depriving their linguistic minorities of basic rights, plead that English and French are "the" language of human rights. English 2000 publicity declares: "The English language underpins human rights, good government, conflict resolution and the democratic process by ensuring that communities have access to the information society, to the world media and to freedom of opinion." As fundamental human rights are often a question of freedom of political expression or not being imprisoned without trial, one wonders whether the British really think that such existential matters are best ordered for all the world's citizens in English rather than the other 6-7000 oral languages of the world - plus possibly an equal number of sign languages. Such ethnocentric or linguocentric special pleading may appear innocuous, but represents an abuse of the concept of rights for the crude purpose of harnessing human rights to the Diffusion of English cause. Human rights are meaningless if they do not apply to all languages.

One of the first to write about the ecology of language, in an essay in 1970 (published in a volume of the same name, edited by Dil, 1972) was Einar Haugen, a seminal figure in the establishment of bilingualism studies, language planning and sociolinguistics. Language ecology is defined by Haugen as the study of interactions between any given language and its environment. Haugen states that the linguist's concern with language forms and the psychology and sociology of language should be combined with those of other social scientists who are interested in the interaction of languages and their users, for more than descriptive purposes (Dil
1972, 329). Just as ecology is a "movement for environmental sanitation", the ecology of language should be concerned with the cultivation and preservation of languages. It should be a predictive and even a therapeutic science, typically concerned with the status of languages, functions, attitudes, and ultimately with a "typology of ecological classification, which will tell us something about where the language stands and where it is going in comparison with other languages of the world." (op.cit., 337).

Peter Mühlhäusler has considered the impact that language teaching has on linguistic ecology. "When speaking of linguistic ecologies we focus on the number of languages, user groups, social practices and so forth that sustain this language ecology over longer periods of time. Language teaching involves the introduction of a new language into an existing language ecology" (1994, 123), so that what needs studying is the impact of such teaching on the inhabitants and the long-term sustainability of the system. Mühlhäusler considers that language teaching may but need not serve imperialist purposes (echoing Phillipson 1992, 318), but his verdict on the spread of English, French, Indonesian and Chinese in the Pacific and Australasian region is that the teaching of these languages is unlikely to lead to a more stable equitable world or more social justice (op.cit., 128).

When considering Tsuda's Ecology of Language paradigm, we shall mainly focus on his first two points, a human rights perspective, and equality in communication. Of the remaining ones, multilingualism (3) and the maintenance of languages and cultures (4) are matters that we have implicitly endorsed when analysing the Diffusion of English paradigm. We have also shown the need for care in identifying what multilingualism refers to in different fora (UN, EU, ...), and the tendency for "big" languages to be promoted and less powerful ones to be marginalized (official and working languages, ...).

This risk is also apparent in connection with foreign language education (6), as almost invariably "foreign" languages are languages that are dominant somewhere. The advantages of learning foreign languages have already been referred to in connection with language policy developments in Europe and Australia. In both contexts it is accepted that schoolchildren should learn at least one foreign language, and that this is desirable for cultural, practical and general educational reasons. This is a position that the United States could learn from, one that would increase its citizens' capacity to be sensitive to global diversity, as well as providing them with skills that would be necessary in their dealings with other parts of the world (as many publications from the Washington-based National Foreign Language Center have argued), quite apart from capitalizing on the wealth of languages actually present in the country. In Europe it is essential that choice of foreign language is not simply understood as meaning the learning of English, hence the efforts in many states to ensure that two languages are learned. This is a small contribution to maintaining vitality in the language ecology we have inherited.

**Linguistic human rights**

The struggle for linguistic rights represents an attempt to harness fundamental principles and practices from the field of human rights to the task of rectifying some linguistic wrongs and granting to less favoured languages some of the support that is the rule for dominant languages. We believe, and have argued at length elsewhere (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a, Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas 1995) that it is axiomatic that

- *linguistic rights are one type of human right* and as such one intricately interlocking element in
a set of inalienable, universal norms for just enjoyment of one's civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;
- depriving people of their human rights leads to conflict. If the rights of minorities are respected, there is less likelihood of conflict. Linguistic diversity is not causally related to conflict, though of course language is a major mobilising factor in contexts where an ethnic group feels itself threatened.
Efforts are currently under way to codify language rights at the inter-state level, both global (UN bodies such as the ILO) and regional (e.g. European, African). Some documents are applicable to all (a "Universal" declaration/covenant), some are restricted to specified groups which are in need of particular support (e.g. children, migrant workers or indigenous peoples). They have in common the principle that agreement at inter-state level is normative and may hopefully lead to better practice at state level.
Professional associations are increasingly aware of the significance of language rights. TESOL's mission (President's message, TESOL Matters, June/July 1993) "is to strengthen the effective teaching and learning of English around the world while respecting individuals' language rights." This presupposes familiarity with what linguistic human rights (LHRs) are.
LHRs in education can be summarized as follows. Observing LHRs implies at an individual level that everyone can identify positively with their mother tongue(s), and have that identification respected by others, irrespective of whether their mother tongue is a minority language or a majority language. It means the right to learn the mother tongue(s), including at least basic education through the medium of the mother tongue, and the right to use it in many (official) contexts. It means the right to learn at least one of the official languages in one's country of residence. It should therefore be normal that teachers of minority children are bilingual. Restrictions on these rights may be considered linguistic wrongs, an infringement of fundamental LHRs.
Observing LHRs implies at a collective level the right of minority groups to exist, i.e. the right to be "different". It implies the right of minorities to use and develop their language and to establish and maintain schools and other training and educational institutions, with control over the curriculum, and with teaching through the medium of their own languages. It also involves guarantees of representation in the political affairs of the state, and the granting of autonomy to administer matters internal to the groups, at least in the fields of culture, education, religion, information, and social affairs, with the financial means, through taxation or grants, to fulfil these functions. Rights should be enforceable, which presupposes financial resources, and appropriate democratic, constitutional and legal procedures. Restrictions on these rights may also be considered linguistic wrongs, an infringement of fundamental LHRs.
This enumeration of LHRs builds on principles that should be observed when forming language policy in any state. They represent a norm, a standard that states should aspire to, which can be a significant reference point in struggles to influence language policy and wrest rights from an unwilling state. A human rights approach in language education involves the fostering of attitudes - at the local, national and supranational levels - and the elaboration and maintenance of a structure within which the individual and the group do not suffer from oppression, specifically linguistic opposition. If the proclamations of professional associations such as TESOL are to be more than pious rhetoric, the rights in question need to be specified and publicized so that individuals and groups know what they are.
Equality in communication

Tsuda's second point in the Ecology of Language paradigm is that participants in communication should be in a position of equality, irrespective of mother tongue, gender or other distinctions. Equality in communication presupposes that everybody has equal access to information and that the principle of freedom of expression is respected. Equality relates to all participants in a speech event, to all speech communities, and to interaction between members of different speech communities. A major reason for advocating this position is a conviction that native speakers of English have unfair advantages in many contexts over speakers of other languages, a belief that is widely held on the continent of Europe, not least at academic conferences. Such a principle would not only mean, for instance, that under the NAFTA agreement, speakers or companies that use French or Spanish should be in the same position as those who use English. Restricting language policy considerations to the three "big" languages perpetuates inequalities; the fact that the rights of all the indigenous and minority language speakers to equality in communication are mostly not even considered, or their use is deemed unrealistic, shows how far we are from equality in communication. In considering the language policy implications of NAFTA, Labrie (1995) points out that there are major differences and incompatibilities between the three countries in their sociolinguistic make-up, and in language ideologies and the extent of language legislation. Language policy differs substantially between Canada, with explicit laws to ensure the equality of the two dominant languages, and the USA, where much language policy is implicit, and Mexico, which has more actively addressed the bilingualism of its indigenous population (see Hamel 1994). The supremacy of economic over political considerations in NAFTA makes it likely that equality between the English, French and Spanish languages will remain a fiction. Because of the dominant position of English in business, science and culture, and the prestige of the language, English is likely to strengthen its position and impinge on the language ecology in ways that disadvantage non-users and non-native users of English. Adherence to a principle of equality would also mean that the needs of sign language users would need to be met much more widely.

English only worldwide, or English plus

It is clear that following the principles of the Ecology of Language paradigm has costs, financial and human. On the other hand it would be quite false to assume that adherence to the Diffusion of English paradigm does not have costs, both of a practical kind (for education systems, for interpretation in international organizations, Piron 1994, etc) and for the global linguistic ecology. This is where western countries could learn from other parts of the world. Many of the eastern and central European countries have for decades accorded more rights to linguistic minorities in education than most western European countries, this reflecting the focus on minority protection that was a major feature of the treaties enacted at the conclusion of the First World War. It has been seen as natural that (many) national minorities (regardless of whether they are designated nations, nationalities, or minorities) have had at least part of their education through the medium of their own language, and that the majority language has been taught by bilingual teachers. This trend does not seem to be diminishing, although some post-communist governments seem to be set on a path of ethnic and linguistic intolerance and
"cleansing". It is perfectly possible to simultaneously protect national sovereignties (Tsuda's 5) and promote multilingualism internally, two principles that are often seen as contradictory. It is also obviously in the "national interest" of every country to invest in foreign language education for external, "international" purposes.

Awareness of the role of language in what has been termed "ethnic" conflict may be increasing throughout Europe, though the conclusions being drawn may vary. One view is that either the (voluntary or forced) repatriation of minorities or their rapid linguistic and cultural assimilation are ways of avoiding "ethnic" conflict, meaning the mere presence of (unassimilated) minorities is seen as a threat. This is a false analysis of the causal factors in such conflict, leading to a false conclusion that is likely to fan the flames of conflict (Phillipson, Rannut & Skutnabb-Kangas 1994). A more democratic and just analysis regards a higher degree of awareness of linguistic and cultural rights as a hallmark of a civilized society, and the granting of these rights as a way of avoiding or containing conflict. Policy of this kind should contribute to the reduction of linguistic and economic inequalities or linguistic and political cleavages between the groups that make up a polity. The recognition at the continental level of the rights of "minority or regional" languages (e.g. in the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages) is, despite the shortcomings of the Charter (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994b), a step in this direction.

English can serve many useful purposes, but will only do so if the linguistic human rights of speakers of other languages are respected. The historical evidence seems to indicate clearly that linguistic imperialism need to be resisted actively. Just as the subtractive, oppressive monolingualism of the "English Only" movement in the United States is being countered by demands for "English plus" (i.e. English in addition to other languages), Europeans should build on their linguistic diversity by promoting all languages, including English. An immediate way of contributing to this is by building on Tsuda's productive dichotomy when analysing language policy, and by working to promote a healthy and just ecology of language.

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i In addition to "French-speaking" states, the signatory countries were Portugal, Cap Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Greece, Egypt and Romania.

ii Details of the French proposals are described in several pronouncements by government Ministers in 1994 and 1995 and in several publications of the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie (for instance the Actes de la Xème session, 22-24 mars 1994, La Francophonie et l'Europe). Many European children already encounter two foreign languages in their schooling, and some learn 3 or 4, but the picture varies in each country, as does whether first or second foreign language learning is obligatory, see Eurydice 1992.

iii "The (British) Council responded with speed and imagination to the truly enormous demand in the former communist states of Europe for what Britain signifies to them: liberal democracy, the free market and, above all, the English language" (Chairman's Introduction to the British Council Annual Report, 1991-92, 2).


French has been, and still is, energetically promoted at home and abroad, (with the advantage, for researchers interested in such matters, of massive documentation of official policy and legislation). One of the major reasons for French language promotion is the encroachment of English, the rival, and hitherto victorious "world language". One element in contemporary French strategy is to stress the miserable command of the language of most L2 users of English. This purist streak is nothing new in France, but it has been extrapolated and redefined so that in contemporary official French discourse "ce qui n'est pas clair, c'est l'anglais international". This kind of argument is being used in many fora, in particular in European Union institutions. English as a world language is seen as bastardised, truncated communication.

This publication was earlier called the *EFL Gazette*. From mid 1995 it has columns in each number by the president of TESOL and the chair of IATEFL. The journal is monthly, and has a section entitled "A to Z, working your way around the world", which describes the job market in ESL/EFL country by country.

The TESOL statement declares that the association is expansionist (TESOL will work "within the TESOL world and beyond") and will attempt to work through "existing structures" outside the United States, and "respect regional, national, and cultural distinctiveness and autonomy while at the same time promoting mutual understanding" (cited in Nunan 1995, 3). Quite apart from the fuzziness of much of such language, and an ambivalent view of partnership, the statement looks uncannily like a re-run of the ideology that served to underpin the expansion of English and TESOL a generation ago. It echoes the Report of the Makerere Conference in Uganda, 1961 (regarded by the Ford Foundation as the most central one in the formative period of ESL) on the Teaching of English as a Second Language, which reassuringly declares: "Nor can there be any question of believing that we propose, by our efforts, to supersede or weaken or dilute any of the cultures of Asia and Africa." It appears that little changes in cultural and linguistic imperialism... See the detailed analysis of this in Phillipson 1992.

"The globalization of culture is not the same as its homogenization, but globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization (armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies, clothing styles and the like), which are absorbed into local political and cultural economies, only to be repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty, free enterprise, fundamentalism, etc. in which the state plays an increasingly delicate role." (Appadurai 1990, 307).

Foreign language teaching in the smaller EU countries benefits substantially from learners being exposed to foreign films in their original language on television, subtitled, whereas countries like France and Germany dub them.

The French government declared in 1994 that it could not support the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages on the grounds that it was anti-constitutional (Annual Report, 1994 of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, page 20).