Linguistic Human Rights in Education: Western Hypocrisy in European and Global Language Policy

Tove Skutnabb-Kangas

The Okanagan word for "our place on the land" and "our language" is the same. We think of our language as the language of the land. This means that the land has taught us our language. The way we survived is to speak the language that the land offered us as its teachings. To know all the plants, animals, seasons, and geography is to construct language for them.

We also refer to the land and our bodies with the same root syllable. This means that the flesh that is our body is pieces of the land that came to us through the things that this land is. The soil, the water, the air, and all the other life forms contributed parts to be our flesh. We are our land/place. Not to know and to celebrate this is to be without language and without land. It is to be dis-placed. I know what it feels like to be an endangered species on my land, to see the land dying with us. It is my body that is being torn, deforested, and poisoned by "development". Every fish, plant, insect, bird, and animal that disappears is part of me dying. I know all their names, and I touch them with my spirit. (Jeannette Armstrong 1996: 465-466, 470)

The paper is structured as follows. First I sum up a few basics about the state of the world's languages. Then I discuss one argument for why everybody should be multilingual. I have chosen one of the less well known

1 The relationship between language and land is seen as sacred. Most non-indigenous people need a lot of guidance to even start understanding the primacy of land in it. One example from Australia. None of the Aboriginal people participating in the reclaiming of the Awabakal language were descendants of the Awabakal (the last speakers died before 1900) but came from other areas and peoples. Still, they speak about 'our language' and 'our identity' in connection with Awabakal. In Rob Amery's words (1998: 94) 'the revival of Awabakal seems to be based primarily on the association of the language with the land, the language of the place in which a group of Aboriginal people of diverse origins now live'.
arguments, the relationship between biodiversity and linguistic and cultural diversity. Next I claim that most indigenous and minority education participates in committing linguistic genocide according to the United Nations definitions of genocide, and examine to what extent human rights instruments can be used to prevent this and to support the maintenance of linguistic diversity. I am especially interested in the responsibility of the Western states in this linguistic genocide and denial of linguistic human rights (hereafter LHRs) in education. Therefore I assess some aspects of their respect for human rights in general and LHRs in education in particular, partly through their ratifications of HRs instruments, partly exemplifying with some government replies to an OSCE questionnaire. Finally, I say a few words about one aspect of ecology, namely the prerequisites for ruining the planet beyond repair, which I hope my readers can apply to linguistic and cultural ecologies.

1. Introduction: the state of the world’s languages

First some basics. The exact numbers of languages or speakers of languages are not known (lack of resources for their study) and cannot be known (the border between languages and other varieties, e.g. dialects, is political not linguistic). The most useful source on number of languages, The Ethnologue, edited by Barbara Grimes, the Summer Institute of Linguistics, a missionary organisation – see http://www.sil.org/ethnologue/ lists almost 6,800 languages in 228 countries. But it only mentions 114 Sign languages. Still, there are deaf people in all societies, and while hearing people have developed spoken, oral languages, the Deaf have developed Sign languages, full-fledged, complex, abstract languages (see Branson & Miller 1998, 2000, for brilliant analyses of the treatment of Sign languages and Jokinen 2000 for the (lack of) LHRs of Sign language users). Those who speak about ‘languages’ but in fact mean oral languages only, participate through invisibilising sign languages in killing half the linguistic diversity on earth.

Most of the world’s languages are spoken by relatively few people: the median number of speakers is probably around 5–6,000 (Posey 1997). Over 95% of the world’s spoken languages have fewer than 1 million native users; some 5,000 have less than 100,000 speakers and more than 3,000 languages have fewer than 10,000 speakers. A quarter of the world’s spoken languages and most of the Sign languages have fewer than 1,000 users, and
at least some 500 languages had in 1999 under 100 speakers (The *Ethnologue*). Some 83-84% of the world's languages are endemic: they exist in one country only (Harmon 1995).

**Table 1. Basic information about languages**

- There are 6-7,000 spoken languages (see *The Ethnologue*, http://www.sil.org/ethnologue/), and maybe equally many Sign languages.
- The median number of speakers of a language is probably around 5-6,000
- Over 95% of the world's spoken languages have fewer than 1 million native users
- Some 5,000 spoken languages have fewer than 100,000 speakers
- Over 3,000 spoken languages have fewer than 10,000 users
- Some 1,500 spoken languages and most of the Sign languages have fewer than 1,000 users
- Some 500 languages had in 1999 fewer than 100 speakers
- 83-84% of the world's spoken languages are endemic: they exist in one country only

Linguists are today working with the description of the world's linguistic diversity in the same way as biologists describe and list the world's biodiversity. There are *Red books for threatened languages*, in the same way as for threatened animals and plants and other species (Tables 2 and 3).

**Table 2. Red lists for threatened animals and plants**

The web-sites for the Red Lists of Threatened Plants and Threatened Animals are

http://www.rbge.org.uk/data/wcmc/plants.by.taxon.html;
http://www.wcmc.org.uk/species/plants/plant_redlist.html;
http://www.wcmc.org.uk/species/animals/.

These lists are monitored by World Conservation Monitoring Centre:
http://www.wcmc.org.uk/species/data/index.html

**Table 3. Red books for threatened languages**

*Europe*: http://www.helsinki.fi/~tasalmin/europe_index.html

*Northeast Asia*: http://www.helsinki.fi/~tasalmin/nasia_index.html

*Asia and the Pacific*: http://www.tooyoo.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/redbook/asiapacific/asia-index.html

*Africa*: http://www.tooyoo.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/redbook/africa-index.html


*Russia*: http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/

*South America*: http://www.tooyoo.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/redbooks/Samerica/index.html
A language is threatened if it has few users and a weak political status, and, especially, if children are no longer learning it, i.e. when the language is no longer transmitted to the next generation. There are detailed definitions of the degree of threat or endangerment.

Habitat destruction, for instance through logging, spread of agriculture, use of pesticides, and the poor economic and political situation of the people who live in the world’s most diverse ecoregions, have been identified as some of the main causes for the disappearance of biodiversity. What most people do not know is that disappearance of languages may also be or become a very important cause.

While new trees can be planted and habitats restored, it is much more difficult to restore languages once they have been murdered. Languages are today disappearing at a faster pace than ever before in human history. What happens is linguistic genocide on a massive scale, with formal education and media as the main concrete culprits but with the world’s political, economic and military structures as the more basic causal factors. Big languages turn into killer languages, monsters that gobble up others, when they are learned at the cost of the smaller ones. Instead, they should and could be learned in addition to the various mother tongues.

Even the most ‘optimistic realistic’ linguists now estimate that half of today’s oral languages may have disappeared or at least not be learned by children in a 100 years’ time, whereas the ‘pessimistic but realistic’ researchers (e.g. Krauss 1992) estimate that we may only have some 10% of today’s oral languages (or even 5%, some 300 languages) left as vital, non-threatened languages in the year 2100. 90% may be ‘dead’ or ‘on the death row’, ‘moribund’ (negative terms that many, including myself, object to). Languages can of course also be ‘reborn’ or ‘reclaimed’ – there is a handful of examples of this. Kaurna in Australia is one (see Amery 2000). Those who speak it now say that it was not dead – even if the last speaker died in the late 1920s – it was only sleeping. But so far it has happened seldom, and fairly few new languages arise.

Hearing that languages are disappearing, many people might say: so what? It might be better for world peace if we all speak a few big languages and understand each other – only romantic linguists want to preserve the small ones². Here I present only one of the many counterarguments against

---

linguistic genocide and for support for the maintenance of linguistic diversity (hereafter LD): the relationship between linguistic diversity and biodiversity.

2. The relationship between linguistic diversity and biodiversity

Maintenance of diversities, in the plural, is one end of a continuum where ecocide and linguistic genocide are at the other end. We start with biodiversity. Monocropping, pesticides, deforestation, genetic engineering and the wrong use of fertilisers and irrigation have led to an unprecedented decrease of all kinds of biodiversity, including agrobiodiversity. People consume at least 7,000 species of plants, but 'only' 150 species are commercially important and about 103 species account for 90 percent of the world's food crops. Just three crops – rice, wheat and maize – account for about 60 percent of the calories and 56 percent of the protein people derive from plants' (Thrupp 1999: 318). The remaining crop diversity (already low) is eroding at 1-2% and livestock breeds at 5% per annum (Christie & Moonie 1999: 321). 'Almost all farmers' knowledge of plants and research systems [something that has been built up during the 12,000 years of agriculture, Thrupp 1999: 318] could become extinct within one or two generations' (Christie/Moonie 1999: Table 7.5). Likewise, 'almost all local knowledge of medicinal plants and systems as well as the plants themselves could disappear within one generation' (ibid.). 'Rainforests are coming down at a rate of 0.9 percent per annum and the pace is picking up. Much of the earth's remaining diversity could be gone within one or two generations' (ibid.).

Still, linguistic diversity is disappearing relatively much faster than biodiversity. Table 4 presents a very simple comparison based on numbers and extinction rates (see my 2000a for details). According to

- Optimistic realistic estimates, 2% of biological species but 50% of languages may be dead (or moribund) in 100 years' time.
- Pessimistic realistic estimates, 20% of biological species but 90% of languages may be dead (or moribund) in 100 years' time.
Linguistic and cultural diversity on the one hand and biodiversity on the other hand are correlated – where one type is high, often the other one is too, and vice versa. One of the organisations investigating this relationship is Terralingua\textsuperscript{3}. 'Terralingua is a non-profit international organisation devoted to preserving the world’s linguistic diversity and to investigating links between biological and cultural diversity.' Conservationist David Harmon is the General Secretary of Terralingua. He has investigated correlations between biological and linguistic diversity. Harmon has compared endemism of languages and higher vertebrates (mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians), with the top 25 countries for each type (1995: 14) (Table 5). I have \textbf{BOLDED} and \textsc{Capitalised} those countries which are on \textit{both} lists. 16 of the 25 countries are on both lists, a coincidence of 64%. According to Harmon (1995: 6) 'it is very unlikely that this would only be accidental.' Harmon gets the same results with flowering plants and languages, butterflies and languages, etc. – a high correlation between countries with biological and linguistic megadiversity (see also Harmon, forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{3} For connections between biodiversity and linguistic and cultural diversity, see Terralingua's web-site http://www.terralingua.org.
Table 5. Endemism in languages and higher vertebrates: a comparison of the top 25 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Endemic languages</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Endemic higher vertebrates</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. PAPUA NEW GUINEA</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>1. AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>1.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. INDONESIA</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>2. MEXICO</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nigeria</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>3. BRAZIL</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. INDIA</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>4. INDONESIA</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>5. Madagascar</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. MEXICO</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>6. PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. CAMEROON</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>7. INDIA</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. BRAZIL</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>8. PERU</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ZAIRE</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>9. COLOMBIA</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>10. Ecuador</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. USA</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>11. USA</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Vanuatu</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>12. CHINA</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. TANZANIA</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>13. PAPUA NEW GUINEA</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Malaysia</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>15. Argentina</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>16. Cuba</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. CHINA</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>17. South Africa</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. PERU</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18. ZAIRE</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Chad</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>19. Sri Lanka</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Russia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>20. New Zealand</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. SOLOMON ISLANDS</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>21. TANZANIA</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Nepal</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22. Japan</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. COLOMBIA</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23. CAMEROON</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24. SOLOMON ISLANDS</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Canada</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25. ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26. Somalia</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
New and exciting research shows mounting evidence for the hypothesis that it might not only be a correlational relationship. It may also be causal: the two types of diversities seem to mutually enforce and support each other (see Maffi 2000, ed. 2001). UNEP (United Nations Environmental Program), one of the organisers of the world summit on biodiversity in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (see Heywood, ed., 1995), published in December 1999 a mega-volume called Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity. A Complementary Contribution to the Global Biodiversity Assessment (Posey, ed., 1999) summarising much of this evidence. The strong correlation need not indicate a direct causal relationship, in the sense that neither type of diversity should probably be seen directly as an independent variable in relation to the other. But linguistic and cultural diversity may be decisive mediating variables in sustaining biodiversity itself, and vice versa, as long as humans are on the earth. Of course there was no relationship in pre-human times, but as soon as humans came into existence, they started to influence the rest of nature. Today it is safe to say that there is no 'wild' nature left – all landscapes have been and are influenced by human action, even those where untrained observers might not notice it immediately. All landscapes are cultural landscapes. Likewise, local nature and people's detailed knowledge about it and use of it have influenced the cultures, languages and cosmo-visions of the people who have been dependent on it for their sustenance. This relationship between all kinds of diversities is of course what most indigenous peoples have always known, and they describe their knowledge in several articles in the Posey volume.

The article on linguistic diversity in it is written by Terralingua's President, Luisa Maffi, and myself (Maffi, Skutnabb-Kangas & Andrianarivo 1999; see also articles in Maffi (ed.) 2001). We suggest that if the long-lasting coevolution which people have had with their environments from time immemorial is abruptly disrupted, without nature (and people) getting enough time to adjust and adapt (see Mühlhäusler, 1996), we can expect a catastrophe. The adjustment needed takes hundreds of years, not only decades (see Mühlhäusler, 1996; see also Mühlhäusler 2000, in press). Just to take one example: nuances in the knowledge about medicinal plants and their use disappear when indigenous youth in Mexico become bilingual without teaching in and through the medium of their own languages – the knowledge is not transferred to Spanish which
does not have the vocabulary for these nuances (see Luisa Maffi’s doctoral dissertation, 1994).

Those of us who discuss these links between biodiversity and linguistic diversity get attacked by some linguists and others who accuse us of Social Darwinism. A representative sample for these attacks claims that

relying on biomorphic metaphors implies that dominant languages are fitter than others and that "primitive" languages, unable to adapt to the modern world, deserve their fate.

Much of the accusations have to do with lack of interdisciplinary knowledge – most linguists do not know enough about present-day biology to be able to see what the biological metaphors and the claims of a causal relationship stand for. I have in another paper (Skutnabb-Kangas, in press e) deconstructed the attacking claim a bit, with arguments from conservationist David Harmon. On this lack of knowledge, Harmon says:

This [is] the usual misunderstanding of evolution by people in non-biology disciplines who tend to parrot the "received view" of biological phobia and cannot or will not distinguish Social Darwinism (which of course has long since been discredited [...] from neo-Darwinism as it is now understood by evolutionary biologists.

Harmon then goes on to explain this present biological understanding about "fitness" and "evolution". Before the weaving together, Harmon has the following to say about "primitive":

You would have to look long and hard to find a biologist of repute who claims that any one species is more "primitive" than others, other than in the obvious morphological sense of cellular complexity, and that therefore one species is worth more than another – which is what [the attacker] wishes to project on biology when [s/he] (invalidly) mixes the political, value-laden language of "dominant" and "primitive" languages into [his/her] argument. The argument is really a kind of backdoor anthropocentrism, whether realized or not.

And then comes the final sum-up:

Now the crux of the question as [the attacker] applies it in [his/her] quote above, is: what does it mean to say that "primitive" languages are "unable to adapt to the modern world"? We know that it DOES NOT mean that they couldn’t adapt linguistically; it is the consensus among linguists, is it not, that any language has the internal resources to cope with extralinguistic change and innovation, of whatever

---

I do not want to disclose the identity of the accuser since this comes from a private email exchange, and I respect this person’s general views very much.
scope, if there were no (extrinsic, non-linguistic) sociopolitical pressures on it. That condition is perfect "fitness" in the strict Darwinian sense. [The attacker], like so many others, is not distinguishing between this un-teleological, evolutionary condition and the radically different, non-evolutionary, volitional processes of sociopolitical change that are the real causes rendering languages "unable to adapt to the modern world". A giveaway: note the tag phrase "deserve their fate": from fitness we have segued to a declaration of (1) morality, as in just desserts, and (2) fate, as in predestination. An impermissible leap, if the two distinct senses are left undistinguished.


Ecological diversity is essential for long-term planetary survival. All living organisms, plants, animals, bacteria and humans survive and prosper through a network of complex and delicate relationships. Damaging one of the elements in the ecosystem will result in unforeseen consequences for the whole of the system. Evolution has been aided by genetic diversity, with species genetically adapting in order to survive in different environments. Diversity contains the potential for adaptation. Uniformity can endanger a species by providing inflexibility and unadaptability. Linguistic diversity and biological diversity are ... inseparable. The range of cross fertilisation becomes less as languages and cultures die and the testimony of human intellectual achievement is lessened.

In the language of ecology, the strongest ecosystems are those that are the most diverse. That is, diversity is directly related to stability; variety is important for long-term survival. Our success on this planet has been due to an ability to adapt to different kinds of environment over thousands of years (atmospheric as well as cultural). Such ability is born out of diversity. Thus language and cultural diversity maximises chances of human success and adaptability.

If we during the next 100 years murder 50-90% of the linguistic (and thereby mostly also the cultural) diversity which is our treasury of historically developed knowledge, and includes knowledge about how to maintain and use sustainably some of the most vulnerable and most biologically diverse environments in the world, we are also seriously undermining our chances of life on earth.

Killing linguistic diversity is then, just as the killing of biodiversity, dangerous reductionism. Monocultures are vulnerable, in agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, as we see in increasingly more dramatic ways, when animals, bacteria and crops which are more and more resistant (to antibiotics, to Roundups, etc.), are starting to spread — and we have just seen
the tip of the iceberg. With genetic manipulations the problems are mounting rapidly.

In terms of the new ways of coping that we are going to need, the potential for the new lateral thinking that might save us from ourselves in time, lies in having as many and as diverse languages and cultures as possible. We do not know which ones have the right medicine. For maintaining all of them, multilingualism is necessary. Multilingualism should of course, then be one of the most important goals in education.

In my view everybody should be minimally bilingual, and preferably multilingual. This is true for both dominant group majority populations and for indigenous and minority peoples. It is a perfectly feasible goal, also for schools. We know approximately what should be done with various groups, with various prerequisites, in order to support and enable children so that they can become high level multilinguals. Still, this is not done. On the one hand, schools prevent many dominant majority group children from learning other languages really well. On the other hand, most of the education of minorities functions in glaring contradiction to what we know should be done. Schools participate in linguistic genocide vis-à-vis indigenous and linguistic minority children all over the world. Schools cannot save languages alone – families and the whole society are needed for that – but schools can kill languages more or less on their own – and they do. And Western countries bear, both directly and indirectly, much of the responsibility for this.

3. Most indigenous and minority education participates in committing linguistic genocide
It is clear from the statistics of number of languages and number of speakers that indigenous peoples and minorities are the main depository of the LD of the world. Therefore, it is decisive what happens to their languages. Many of them have traditionally been multilingual, and they have maintained their own languages. Today, as formal education reaches more and more people, schools can kill in one generation languages which, in situations without western type of formal schooling, were maintained for hundreds or even thousands of years or more.

The education of indigenous peoples and minorities in large parts of the world is today being organised in direct contradiction of our best scientific knowledge of how it should be organised, and so is the
education of both minorities and numerically large but politically
dominated groups in most African and many Asian countries (see
Skutnabb-Kangas 2000a for details in the claims; see Brock-Utne 1999
and Prah 1995 for Africa). Most of this education participates in
committing linguistic and cultural genocide, according to Articles II (e)
and (b) of the UN International Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (E793, 1948):

Article II(e), 'forcibly transferring children of the group to another group'; and
Article II(b), 'causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group';
(emphasis added).

Likewise, most minority education is guilty of linguistic genocide
according to the 1948 special definition (not part of the present Conven-
tion)

Article III(1) 'Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse
or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the
group'.

Pirjo Janulf (1998) shows in a longitudinal study that of those Finnish
immigrant minority members in Sweden who had had Swedish-medium
education, not one spoke any Finnish to their own children. Even if they
themselves might not have forgotten their Finnish completely, their
children were certainly forcibly transferred to the majority group, at least
linguistically. This is what happens to millions of speakers of threatened
languages all over the world. There are no schools or classes teaching
through the medium of the threatened indigenous or minority languages.
The transfer to the majority language speaking group is not voluntary:
alternatives do not exist, and parents do not have enough reliable
information about the long-term consequences of the various choices.
'Prohibition' can be direct or indirect. If there are no minority teachers in
the pre-schools/schools and if the minority languages are not used as the
main media of education, the use of these languages is indirectly prohibited
in daily intercourse/in schools, i.e. it is a question of linguistic genocide.

Assimilationist submersion education where minorities are taught
through the medium of dominant languages, causes mental harm and leads
to the students using the dominant language with their own children later
on, i.e. over a generation or two the children are linguistically and often in
other ways too forcibly transferred to a dominant group. My latest book
Linguistic genocide in education — or worldwide diversity and human rights? (2000a) provides hundreds of examples of the prohibition, the harm it causes, and the forcible transfer (see also, e.g. Baugh 2000, Cummins 1996, 2000, Kouritzin 1999, Lowell & Devlin 1999, Williams 1998, Wong Fillmore 1991). Formal education which is subtractive, i.e. which teaches children something of a dominant language at the cost of their first language, is genocidal. By comparison, learning new languages, including the dominant languages which most children obviously see is in their best interest to learn, should happen additively, in addition to their own languages.

Educational LHRs which guarantee additive language learning are also what is needed for preventing linguistic genocide and for linguistic diversity to be maintained on earth. And the knowledge about how to organise education that respects LHRs certainly exists (see, e.g., Huss 1999, Huss et al., in press, May (ed.) 1999, Skutnabb-Kangas (ed.) 1995, just to mention a few).

4. The human rights system does not prevent linguistic genocide
Mother tongue medium education should be a basic inalienable linguistic human right (LHR). But international and European binding Covenants, Conventions and Charters give very little support to linguistic human rights in education (e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994). Language gets in them a much poorer treatment than other central human characteristics. Often language disappears completely in binding educational paragraphs, for instance, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) where the paragraph on education (26) does not refer to language at all. Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted in 1966 and in force since 1976), having mentioned language on a par with race, colour, sex, religion, etc. in its general Article (2.2), does explicitly refer to ‘racial, ethnic or religious groups’ in its educational Article (13.1). However, here it omits reference to language or linguistic groups:

... education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups ... (emphasis added)

When language IS in educational paragraphs of human rights instruments, the Articles dealing with education, especially the right to mother tongue
medium education, are more vague and/or contain many more opt-outs and modifications than any other Articles (see, e.g., Kontra et al., eds, 1999; Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994, 1995, 1996; Skutnabb-Kangas, 1996a, b, 1998, 1999, 2000a; Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1994, 1997, 1998). I will show you just a couple of examples of how language in education gets a different treatment from everything else. In the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (adopted by the General Assembly in December 1992), most of the Articles use the obligating formulation 'shall' and have few let-out modifications or alternatives – except where linguistic rights in education are concerned. Compare the unconditional formulation in Article 1 about identity, with the education Article 4.3:

1.1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.
1.2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.
4.3. States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue. (emphases added, 'obligating' in italics, 'opt-outs' in bold).

The same types of formulation as in Art. 4.3 abound even in the latest HRs instruments. The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is in force since 1999. We again find that the Article covering medium of education is so heavily qualified that the minority is completely at the mercy of the state:

In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible and within the framework of their education systems, that persons belonging to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught in the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language (emphases added).

The Framework Convention has been criticised by both politicians and even international lawyers who are normally very careful in their comments, like Patrick Thornberry, Professor of Law at Keele University. His final general assessment of the provisions, after a careful comment on details, is:
Despite the presumed good intentions, the provision represents a low point in drafting a minority right; there is just enough substance in the formulation to prevent it becoming completely vacuous (Thornberry 1997: 356-357).

We can see a similar pattern of vague formulations, modifications and alternatives in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. A state can choose which paragraphs or subparagraphs it wishes to apply (a minimum of 35 is required). Again, the formulations in the education Article, 8, include a range of modifications, including 'as far as possible', 'relevant', 'appropriate', 'where necessary', 'pupils who so wish in a number considered sufficient', 'if the number of users of a regional or minority language justifies it', as well as a number of alternatives, as in 'to allow, encourage or provide teaching in or of the regional or minority language at all the appropriate stages of education' (emphases added). Of course there are real problems in writing binding formulations which are sensitive to local conditions. Still, it is clear that the opt-outs and alternatives in the Charter permit a reluctant state to meet the requirements in a minimalist way, which it can legitimate by claiming that a provision was not 'possible' or 'appropriate', or that numbers were not 'sufficient' or did not 'justify' a provision, or that it 'allowed' the minority to organise teaching of their language as a subject, at their own cost.

This means, that minority languages and sometimes even their speakers MIGHT "as far as possible", and within the framework of [the State's] education systems, get some vaguely defined rights, 'appropriate measures', or 'adequate opportunities', "if there is sufficient demand" and "substantial numbers" or "pupils who so wish in a number considered sufficient" or "if the number of users of a regional or minority language justifies it". All these examples come from the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, both in force since 1999. The Articles covering medium of education are so heavily qualified that the minority is completely at the mercy of the state.

Still, the human rights system should protect people in the globalisation process rather than giving market forces free range. Human rights, especially economic and social rights, are, according to human rights lawyer Katarina Tomaševski (1996: 104), to act as correctives to the free market. The first international human rights treaty abolished slavery. Prohibiting slavery implied that people were not supposed to be treated as
market commodities. ILO (The International Labour Organisation) has added that labour should not be treated as a commodity. But price-tags are to be removed from other areas too. Tomaševski claims (ibid., 104) that

The purpose of international human rights law is ... to overrule the law of supply and demand and remove price-tags from people and from necessities for their survival.

These necessities for survival include not only basic food and housing (which would come under economic and social rights), but also basics for the sustenance of a dignified life, including basic civil, political and cultural rights. It should, therefore, be in accordance with the spirit of human rights to grant people full linguistic human rights.

There are some recent positive developments but no results are in sight yet, and there is little reason to be optimistic. There is a proper condemnation of subtractive submersion education in The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (http://www.osce.org/hcnm/). These Recommendations, published in 1996 by OSCE’s (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, represent authoritative guidelines for minority education for the 55 member states (which include Canada and the United States). They are an authoritative interpretation and concretisation of the minimum in present HRs standards (see also van der Stoel 1997, Rothenberger 1997). Even if the term used is "national minority", the guidelines also apply to other groups, for instance immigrated minorities, and one does NOT need to be a citizen in order to be protected by the guidelines (both these observations follow from the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on Article 27). I would like all of you to go home and find out to what extent your country lives up to the Hague Recommendations in your minority education.

In the section 'The spirit of international instruments’, bilingualism is seen as a right and responsibility for persons belonging to national minorities (Art. 1), and states are reminded not to interpret their obligations in a restrictive manner (Art. 3). In the section on 'Minority education at primary and secondary levels’, mother tongue medium education is recommended at all levels, also in secondary education. This includes bilingual teachers in the dominant language as a second language (Articles 11-13). Teacher training is made a duty on the state (Art. 14) (see Table 6).
Table 6. Articles 11-14 and the Note on submersion education from The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities & Explanatory Note

11) The first years of education are of pivotal importance in a child’s development. Educational research suggests that the medium of teaching at pre-school and kindergarten levels should ideally be the child’s language. Wherever possible, States should create conditions enabling parents to avail themselves of this option.

12) Research also indicates that in primary school the curriculum should ideally be taught in the minority language. The minority language should be taught as a subject on a regular basis. The State language should also be taught as a subject on a regular basis preferably by bilingual teachers who have a good understanding of the children’s cultural and linguistic background. Towards the end of this period, a few practical or non-theoretical subjects should be taught through the medium of the State language. Wherever possible, States should create conditions enabling parents to avail themselves of this option.

13) In secondary school a substantial part of the curriculum should be taught through the medium of the minority language. The minority language should be taught as a subject on a regular basis. The State language should also be taught as a subject on a regular basis preferably by bilingual teachers who have a good understanding of the children’s cultural and linguistic background. Throughout this period, the number of subjects taught in the State language, should gradually be increased. Research findings suggest that the more gradual the increase, the better for the child.

14) The maintenance of the primary and secondary levels of minority education depends a great deal on the availability of teachers trained in all disciplines in the mother tongue. Therefore, ensuing from the obligation to provide adequate opportunities for minority language education, States should provide adequate facilities for the appropriate training of teachers and should facilitate access to such training.

Finally, the Explanatory Note states that *[S]ubmersion-type approaches whereby the curriculum is taught exclusively through the medium of the State language and minority children are entirely integrated into classes with children of the majority are not in line with international standards’ (p. 5). Remember that most of the education offered to indigenous and minority children in Europe and North America is submersion.

But even if some improvements might be on their way, it has to be mentioned that having full legally guaranteed LHRs is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for languages to be maintained. Teresa McCarty and Lucille Watahomigie (1999) discuss the language education of the ‘nearly two million American Indians, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians [who] reside in the USA, representing over 500 tribes and 175 distinct languages’ (p. 79). The article starts with a denouncement of
subtractive education. One of the important conclusions is that 'language rights have not guaranteed language maintenance, which ultimately depends on the home language choices of Native speakers' (91). What this means is that bottom-up initiatives are urgent. There must be incentives for people to transmit their own languages to the next generation, and these incentives need to be both affective and instrumental.

5. Assessing "respect" for human rights, with ratifications as a criterion

Next, I will look at one of today's mantras, human rights, and especially minority rights in terms of protection of minority languages, and relate this to the demands that the present EU members make on themselves and the demands that are being made by the member states and other Western states on other countries, here especially the aspirant members of the EU. For some of the new EU creations, like the joint currency system, there are specified demands that the states which are already EU members have to fulfil in order to join the new system. But in terms of most human rights it is automatically assumed that the old members do fulfil the requirements, and therefore their performance is not evaluated in the same way as the performance of the aspirant countries. It seems to me fair that we should use the same criteria when evaluating all the countries, not only the possibly incoming ones. This is what I propose to start doing in terms of educational language rights in the short and hence necessarily very general presentation here.

The 38 'European' countries that I have included in much of this exercise are the ones listed in Table 7. Even if several of the other ex-USSR countries could have been included too, I decided only to include those which are already members of the Council of Europe.

---

Some of the really small Council of Europe member countries have been left out (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino).
Table 7. EU member countries (*), and countries which "have expressed interest in membership" plus some additional possibles


When we think of those countries which are or have expressed a wish to be part of the European Union enlargement project, and compare them in terms of educational language rights with the 15 countries which are already members, we can group the countries along several continua. The ordering of states on them depends on what criteria we use for assessing to what extent the various countries "respect" educational language rights. I have chosen to use one set of more formal evaluations of signatures and ratifications and another tentative one more oriented towards implementation.

The first continuum shows to what extent various countries respect general UN human rights instruments (Table 8). For the second group of continua, I have chosen some of those international and European human rights instruments which are about minority protection and/or contain specific articles about educational language rights (Tables 9-11). In all these, "respect" is measured by whether or not they have signed and ratified them. The information is based on UNESCO 2000 which shows the situation as of 31st May 2000. For the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, later ratifications have been added from the webpages of the instrument. One should, of course, add at least three types of additional information, about additional protocols, about reservations and declarations, and, for some instruments, especially the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, both the languages that specific countries have included, and the paragraphs which they have chosen – sometimes these change the picture fairly radically. This type of a more total overview would be needed too but time restrictions prevent me from doing it here (but see my 2000b for an earlier and in press f for a more thorough comparison).
Table 8. Number of the 52 Universal Human Rights Instruments ratified by 31st May 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alphabetical order</th>
<th>Rank order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania, 31</td>
<td>44 Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria*, 39</td>
<td>42 Croatia,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium*, 34</td>
<td>41 Denmark*, Finland*, Netherlands*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria, 35</td>
<td>40 Hungary, Italy*, Spain*, Sweden*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia, 42</td>
<td>39 Austria*, Germany*, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus, 37</td>
<td>38 Slovak Republic, Slovenia, United Kingdom*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic, 35</td>
<td>37 Cyprus, Macedonia, Romania, Russian Federation, Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark*, 41</td>
<td>35 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France*, Greece*, Latvia,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia, 26</td>
<td>34 Belgium*, Iceland, Luxembourg*, Malta, Portugal*, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland*, 41</td>
<td>33 Ireland*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*, 35</td>
<td>31 Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*, 39</td>
<td>30 Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece*, 35</td>
<td>26 Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary, 40</td>
<td>24 Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland, 34</td>
<td>25 Lithuania, Moldova (Republic of)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland*, 33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy*, 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia, 35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania, 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg*, 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (The former Yugoslavia Republic of), 37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta, 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (Republic of), 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands*, 41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway, 44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland, 39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal*, 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania, 37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation, 37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic, 38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia, 38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain*, 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden*, 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland, 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey, 24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine, 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom*, 38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia, 37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean for 15 member countries 37.6
Mean for 23 non-members 34.52;

of these
- 6 closest aspirants 35,33
  (5 without Estonia, 37,2)
- remaining 17 countries 34.24

We might somewhat artificially place cutting points between countries which have signed and ratified all or most of the instruments (those above 40 ratifications), group A, those who are really well on their way (between 34 and 40), group B, and those which still have either some way or even a long way to go (the ones at or under 33), group C. One of the interesting result is that there is, except for a few, not much difference between member countries and not-yet-member countries. The mean for the 15 member countries is 37.6 ratifications, and the non-member
countries 34,246. The difference is not large but it is there. Still, we would expect all of the member countries (instead of only 6 of the 15) to be in group A in order to be fit to criticize non-member countries.

I have also divided the non-member countries into those 6 which are in the first group to become members, and the rest. The mean for member countries was 37.6 ratifications. Compare this with 35.33 for the 6 aspirants/applicants closest to joining (Estonia 26, Hungary 40, Poland 39, Slovenia 38, Czech Republic 36 and Malta 35), and 34.24 for the rest. One of the aspirants, Estonia, has one of the lowest records on the whole list (see Rannut 1999 for some of the complexities), and without Estonia the remaining 5 aspirants, with a mean of 37.2 are more or less at the same level as the present members, if one measures "respect" by the number of ratifications. It is also interesting to note that of the non-member countries outside the first 6 aspirants, 3, Norway, Croatia, and the Slovak Republic, are above the mean for member states, whereas Belgium*, Luxembourg*, Portugal* and Ireland* of the member states are lower than the mean for the non-member states outside the group of 6. It is also telling that the United States of America, posing as The Defender of Human Rights globally, occupies, together with 4 other countries, a shared 161st-164th position of 193, in terms of the number of its own ratifications of Universal Human Rights Instruments – hardly a morally convincing record (still down from May 1998 when it held a 156th – 161st position). Likewise, having only ratified 3 (21.4%) of the 14 American Regional Instruments, it occupies, together with 2 other countries, a shared 22nd – 24th place out of 35 (see my in press d for these figures). The USA does not recognise the authority of international law over US law, something that can be exemplified by the fact that "American representatives on the United Nations Security Council vetoed a resolution calling on all governments to observe international law" as Noam Chomsky notes (1991: 16, as quoted in Pilger 1998: 27). Another example: the United States was the only state voting against the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986 (General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4

6 If we had added the four small non-member countries, Andorra (6), Liechtenstein (18), Monaco (13) and San Marino (20), the mean would have been much lower but in my opinion these countries need to be left out because of their size. Luxembourg is only included because it is an EU member state.
December 1986). The Declaration "provides in its Article 8(1) that States shall undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realization of the right to development and shall ensure inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education ... employment and the fair distribution of income" (Eide 1995, 39; emphasis added). It is also interesting to see where the so called "rogue states" are placed (Iran between 141-145, Iraq 104-111, Libya 53-57 and North Korea 173-175). All others except North Korea show a better record than the USA.

As a prerequisite to asking other states to play a fair game in the international arena, states ought to follow the commonly agreed rules, rather than being rules onto themselves. We need to assess all states with the same yardstick – everything else is pure hypocritical power politics and against basic democracy.

For all Council of Europe human rights instruments, the rank order is the same as for the UN instruments, but the difference between EU members and non-members is considerably larger (see Skutnabb-Kangas, in press f). Of the member countries, Belgium and the UK place themselves fairly low.

For the next continuum, I have chosen among the human rights instruments only those which are central for the protection of minorities in general. I have here followed van der Stoel 1999: 8-9, where he discusses negative and positive rights (or toleration-oriented non-discrimination prescriptions and promotion-oriented rights; see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994), as the two human rights pillars:

the right to non-discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights; and the right to the maintenance and development of identity through the freedom to practise or use those special and unique aspects of their minority life – typically culture, religion, and language.

The first protection can be found, for instance, in paragraph 31 of the Copenhagen Document, Articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR, Article 14 of the ECHR, Article 4 of the Framework Convention, and Article 3(11) of the 1992 UN Declaration. It ensures that minorities receive all of the other protections without regard to their ethnic, national, or religious status; they thus enjoy a number of linguistic rights that all persons in the state enjoy, such as freedom of expression and the right in criminal proceedings to be informed of the charge against them in a...
language they understand, if necessary through an interpreter provided free of charge.

The second pillar, encompassing affirmative obligations beyond non-discrimination, appears, for example, in paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen Document, Article 27 of the ICCPR, Article 5 of the Framework Convention, and Article 2(1) of the 1992 UN Declaration. It includes a number of rights pertinent to minorities simply by virtue of their minority status, such as the right to use their language. This pillar is necessary because a pure non-discrimination norm could have the effect of forcing people belonging to minorities to adhere to a majority language, effectively denying them their rights to identity... (OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 1999: 8-9).

I have included in my list three of the instruments that van der Stoel mentions. Neither the Copenhagen Document nor the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 1992 are binding documents to be ratified and can thus not be assessed and included. I have also, symbolically, added the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 1990 (A/RES/45/158). Significantly because of too few ratifications, is not in force yet. Of the 12 ratifications as of May 2000, only Bosnia and Herzegovina is in Europe ... It would, of course, be possible to add instruments which protect against racism, and several others, for instance about the rights of indigenous peoples (but they do not live in most of the countries that we are concerned with here). I assess a country as having ratified the ECHR only if it has also ratified the 5 Amendments and Protocols (numbers 1-6 in UNESCO 2000). Likewise, for ICCPR, ratification of the ICCPR itself, the Optional Protocol, and the Declaration regarding Article 41 (2, 2a and 3 in UNESCO) counts – the country need not for our purpose here have ratified the Second Optional Protocol (about death penalty). Table 10 shows after each country which of the instruments they have ratified, using the numbers from Table 9. It also ranks them in the same way as the earlier assessments.

---

8 For Yugoslavia, see footnote 7. Bosnia and Herzegovina is likewise on the UN but not Council of Europe list. Both have been omitted in Tables 14 and 15.
Table 9. Human rights instruments central for the protection of minorities in general

1. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 1950, and all its Amendments and Protocols;
2. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966;
3. The UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 1990 (A/RES/45/158; not in force yet);

Table 10. Human rights instruments central for the protection of minorities in general, number of ratifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alphabetical order</th>
<th>Rank order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania, 4</td>
<td>4: – none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria*, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td>3: Austria*, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark*, Finland*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium*, 2</td>
<td>Hungary, Italy*, Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden*, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria, 2, 4</td>
<td>2: Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany*, Iceland, Ireland*, Lithuania, Luxembourg*, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td>1: Albania, Belgium*, Cyprus, France*, Latvia, Netherlands*, Poland, Switzerland, United Kingdom*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus, 4</td>
<td>0: Greece*, Portugal*, Turkey, Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td>Mean for 15 member countries 1,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark*, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td>Mean for 22 non-members 2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia, 1, 4</td>
<td>Of these 6 closest aspirants 2,33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland*, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td>remaining 16 countries 1,88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*, 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland, 1, 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland*, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy*, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia, 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania, 1, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg*, 1, 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia 1, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova, 1, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands*, 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland, 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania, 1, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain*, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden*, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine, 1, 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom*,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Here the latest ratifications have been downloaded from the website http://www.conventions.coe.int/treaty/ in April 2001.
Here the 6 aspirant countries top the list by far, with a mean of 2.33, as compared to the member countries’ 1.80, and the mean for the remaining countries, 1.88. Thus it seems a bit surprising that the member countries, with the lowest mean, are so worried about minority protection in the non-member countries. Maybe the worry should change places?

The last continuum on the "respect" list has only one instrument with specific relevance for educational linguistic human rights, namely the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, in force since 1999. Of course all the instruments from the general minority protection list are to some extent relevant too, likewise UNESCO’s Convention against Discrimination in Education (1962), and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990). But as I have shown in many publications, even the possible support from them is minimal. And both are included already in the general human rights instruments evaluated earlier anyway.

Table 11, based on both the UNESCO 2000 and updatings from the relevant web-site (http://www.conventions.coe.int/treaty/), downloaded in May 2001, shows the signatures and ratifications. I have ranked the countries in three categories only:

1. those who have both signed and ratified (regardless of reservations and declarations – in a more detailed assessment these should obviously be considered; see my in press d);
2. those who have only signed but not ratified, and
3. those who have neither signed nor ratified.
Table 11. Signatures and ratifications of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Signed and ratified\textsuperscript{10}</th>
<th>2. Signed only but not ratified</th>
<th>2. Neither signed nor ratified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia*, Denmark*, Finland*, Germany*, Hungary, Netherlands*, Norway, Slovenia, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland, United Kingdom*</td>
<td>Austria*, Cyprus, France*, Iceland, Italy*, Luxembourg*, Malta, Romania, Russian Federation, Macedonia, Ukraine</td>
<td>Albania, Belgium*, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece*, Ireland*, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Portugal*, Slovak Republic, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 of 15 member countries, 46,7%</td>
<td>4 of 15 member countries, 26,7%</td>
<td>4 of 15 member countries, 26,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 of 6 closest aspirants, 33,3%</td>
<td>1 of 6 closest aspirants, 16,7%</td>
<td>3 of 6 closest aspirants, 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 of the remaining 16, 25%</td>
<td>6 of the remaining 16, 37,6%</td>
<td>8 of the remaining 16, 50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What we can see in the results in Table 11 is a picture which is more advantageous to the member countries: almost half of them, as opposed to a third of the 6 closest applicants and only a quarter of the remaining 16 countries have ratified. Signatures but not ratification have come from 26,7% of the EU members, 16,7% of the closest applicants, and from 37,6% of the remaining countries. Only slightly over a quarter (26,7%) of the EU members have neither signed nor ratified, as compared to half of both the closest applicants and the remaining countries.

Since the numbers involved are so small (one human rights instrument only), even a couple of ratifications make a huge difference – for instance, in April 2000 when neither Sweden nor Denmark had yet ratified, the percentage of member countries having ratified would have been lower than that for the remaining countries (20% vs. 23,5%), and the British and Spanish ratifications in the spring of 2001 took the member countries from 33,3%, the same as for the aspiring countries, to the present (mid-May 2001) 46,7%.

All this shows that EU member countries (and Western countries in general) do not always fare best in terms of the number of human rights

\textsuperscript{10} In addition to these 9, Liechtenstein has signed and ratified.
instruments that they have ratified. This is especially true for minority and language-specific instruments. The "remaining countries" are generally at the bottom, though, and sometimes the difference is substantial. On the other hand, there are instances where the 6 closest applicants/aspirants are doing equally well or even better than the members (Tables 9-10, general minority protection), and the differences are in general not large, except for the general regional European instruments (where obviously it takes time for Central and Eastern European countries to catch up\(^{11}\) – and here I have only depended on the UNESCO 2000, showing the situation as of 31\(^{st}\) May 2000, rather than checking each instruments on the UN websites). The general impression thus is that there is respect for human rights in most of the countries, when "respect" is defined in terms of ratifying relevant human rights instruments. Of the countries not faring very well, one (Yugoslavia) is not an applicant, some others (e.g. Lithuania, and Turkey, in many ways the worst one), are negotiating about membership, and one (Greece), is a member.


In the European Union enlargement process, one of the criteria for new countries to be admitted is their human rights and minority rights record. Ratifications are a prerequisite; implementation has to follow. The next Tables present information only about some of the members of the OSCE (which includes Canada and the USA – but their government replies were inadequate, though; only documents written for other purposes were sent to OSCE). These are not based on simple objective figures, as the earlier Tables on ratifications, but on a more complex (and necessarily subjective) assessment. I have mainly based the assessment on information given by the various OSCE governments to Max van der Stoel (OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities) in a large-scale inquiry about the linguistic rights of persons belonging to national minorities in the OSCE area (1999). The countries which did not reply (Albania and Belgium) or which replied but said that they had no national

\(^{11}\) See Druviete 2000, Ozolind 1999 and Rannut 1999 for some of the analyses; see also my 1994. De Varennes 1996 relativizes the issues considerably in his excellent overview but possibly somewhat westerncentric in relation to the performance of the Baltic countries.
minorities (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Portugal) have therefore been left out. In Tables 12 and 13, I have, on the basis of the replies to only one question (number 5) about mother tongue medium (MTM) education, grouped the countries in a very general way, according to to what extent they live up to *The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities & Explanatory Note from the High Commissioner* in their education of minorities\textsuperscript{12}. Some replies do not contain enough information for any kind of grouping. For many countries, the information about immigrated minorities is completely insufficient and occasionally I have therefore used additional or other sources for the assessment, especially for countries with sizeable immigrant minorities. Originally I had intended to use more of the government information (from question 1 about official or state languages or languages with a special status, question 4 about the teaching of minority languages as subjects, question 7 about private schools and question 9 about additional linguistic rights). This was impossible, though, because the government replies in many cases did not differentiate

- between (national) minority languages and foreign languages;
- between teaching through the medium of a language ("in a language", in the report’s terms) and teaching a language as a subject (teaching "of a language" in the report’s terms);
- between traditional national minorities and minorities who have immigrated to these countries (during or soon after he Second World War\textsuperscript{13}, or more recently); even refugees and short-term visitors.

Sadly, this shows a fair degree of ignorance about basic language rights and educational issues. Many governments also ”need to be better aware

\textsuperscript{12} See http://www.osce.org/ for the Recommendations. Both the USA and Canada are members of the OSCE and should follow them; mother tongue medium education and bilingual teachers are recommended. See Skutnabb-Kangas 2000b at http://www.ecmi.de/activities/minority_congress_2000_speeches.htm for the context and a fuller analysis.

\textsuperscript{13} This is of course a division that not everybody agrees with – many western countries and European and international organisations criticise for instance the Baltic countries for their treatment of the Russian immigrant minorities, but do not grant the same rights that they demand for the Russian minorities to those immigrant minorities in their own countries who have been there maybe 20 or 30 years less but still for a considerable length of time.
of the content of the international standards in these various areas” as van der Stoel diplomatically puts it in his conclusions (1999: 37).

In my assessment, I have grouped the countries in three categories where the first (1) represents at least some degree of alignment with the Hague Recommendations, with at least some MTM education for all or most national/immigrant minorities in state schools, even if it is transitional. Category (2) countries have at the most some early-exit transitional MTM education for some national/immigrant minorities but mostly only some teaching of mother tongues as subjects, and not even this as an unconditional right. In category (3) countries there is outright denial of the existence of at least some national minorities. Countries with a question mark (?) do not provide enough information for them to be classified.

Table 12. Assessment of implementation of the OSCE Hague Recommendations; traditional national minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Austria*, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark*, Estonia, Finland*, Germany*, Hungary, Ireland*, Italy*, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain*, Ukraine, United Kingdom*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>France*, Sweden*, Switzerland¹⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Greece*, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. Assessment of implementation of the OSCE Hague Recommendations; immigrated minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Finland*, Netherlands*, Norway, Sweden*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Austria*, Denmark*, France*, Germany*, Italy*, Spain*, United Kingdom*, Greece*, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland*, Moldova, Macedonia, Malta, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Turkey, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁴ Switzerland’s ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages would place it in category (1) whereas the information given to Max van der Stoel on implementation in 1997 did not.
Here we can see that of the three country types (EU members, aspirants, the rest of non-members), all are represented in the highest category in relation to national minorities whereas EU member countries are over-represented in the 2 lower categories.

In relation to the three groups for immigrated minorities, the Baltic countries are alone in the top category. If we had had other states, non-members of the Council of Europe, from the earlier USSR, in the evaluation, most of them would also have made it to the top category. The second group consists of the Netherlands and three Nordic states (excluding Denmark where even the scant "mother tongue as a subject" instruction has repeatedly faced suggestions of being scrapped completely, again today, at the beginning of 2001. If one is born in Denmark, one's mother tongue is Danish, according to the vice-chair of the Social Democrat Party, Lene Jensen (reported in the daily Information, 10 September 2000). Most of the EU member states are in the bottom category. It thus seems that there is a tendency of implementation being taken more seriously in non-member states, in terms of legally guaranteed provisions. Canada would be placed in category 1 and the USA in category 3 for national minorities, and both in category 3 for immigrant minorities.

So far we have compared respect for legal instruments with claims about implementation. Venturing to still less objectively measurable entities, we can also compare claims about implementing legal instruments with the attitudes of governments, inferred from their replies to the OSCE questionnaire and from other official documents. Even in the government replies, one can see both convergence and divergence of attitudes with the legal provisions. The convergence can be both negative (e.g. Turkey or Greece: no or very few rights for linguistic minorities, openly negative attitudes) and positive (e.g. Hungary: excellent rights, positive attitudes – but see my in press d). The divergence can also be both ways even if it is more risky to generalise here (e.g. Britain: some positive rights but some negative government representative attitudes; or positive formulation of attitudes but few factual rights, e.g. Sweden).

Knowing the conditions in various countries in detail, one may also be surprised when reading what some governments claim about their own performance. Government statements are in need of detailed empirical validation, where some results of this empirical investigation might – or
might not – be surprising for the governments themselves. Below I quote a few extracts from government replies from the Annex to van der Stoel 1999. I have added a few comments (in italics) to some replies. The replies show that there is a long way to go, in terms of awareness of language rights.

In principle, the members of the three latter groups [Frisian, Sinti, Roma] speak German in their contacts with the authorities, i.e. the language spoken by all involved. This is so not least in order to rule out misunderstandings which may be caused by translations (reply to question 2, Germany). It is not likely that translation would cause more misunderstandings than no translation.

The members of all the four above groups [Danish, Sorbian, Frisian, Romany] speak German so there are not any language problems (reply to question 3, Germany). German is not the mother tongue of the groups – therefore there may be language problems.

In public administration, the Government’s policy is to deal with Irish speakers on a basis of courtesy and respect for the linguistic preference. People writing to northern Ireland Departments in Irish will have their letters translated and will receive a reply (in English) in the normal way. However, it is not the Government’s policy to move towards a bilingual administration. This could be politically divisive and would undermine progress in recent years in extending interest in the Irish language to the wider Northern Ireland Community (reply to question 1, UK). Is it “courtesy and respect” to reply in the language that people have NOT preferred to use? How can using a language that people understand be divisive? Compare this with Norway and Hungary below – and then Sweden:

… any person who contacts a local public body in the administrative area in Sami language has the right to get a reply in Sami (reply to question 2, Norway15).

The State recognizes the minority languages as a major cohesive factor for their communities (reply to question 1, Hungary). (emphases added).

Persons belonging to the Muslim minority in Thrace come from three different ethnic groups (muslims of Turkish, Pomak and Roma origin). There exist no national or other minority in Greece … Pomak and roma languages are not taught because they do not exist in written form … The Greek State spares no effort in

15 In Sweden, getting a written reply from the authorities in the designated minority languages even in those few municipalities where the languages have maximal rights according to the Swedish ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, is conditional and can be refused (Prop. 1998/99: 143; 7, 9).
upgrading the cultural standards of the minority. (from the reply of Greece). *I have texts in both Pomak and Romani in my library...*

When we look at which minority groups have good protection in the OSCE area, it is clear that some groups are, in terms of both the ratifications and implementation, more or less outside the rights system in most or all countries. I will mention three groups. Even if the Roma/Sinti have recently had some international and European attention in human rights circles, no country has granted the *Roma* any educational language rights in binding human rights instruments. No country has included *Sign languages*¹⁶ among the languages in the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*, despite the fact that Sign languages fulfil all the definitional criteria. The Council of Europe argumentation about the matter is completely false and misguided (see, e.g., Krausneker 1998, Skutnabb-Kangas, in press a), a scandalous fact that should be amended as soon as possible. The *Kurds* (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Bucak 1994 for the lack of their language rights), a nation larger than most official language groups in the EU, are hundred percent invisible in all the instruments and ratifications and in the Turkish replies.

7. Our responsibility for linguistic and cultural ecologies
The intense discussions in Europe about the enlargement of the European Union are usually about the requirements that the aspirant countries are asked to fulfil, in this case in terms of human rights, and specifically linguistic rights of minorities. This discussion of course has to continue. But a heavy element of western hypocrisy characterises some of it at times. Following the pattern set by minority protection demands in connection with the Peace Treaties after the first World War, western countries again demand more from eastern and central European countries than they are prepared to grant to all corresponding minorities (including immigrant minorities) themselves (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994 for examples). Therefore we, in addition to the conditions for external enlargement with more countries, also need to discuss internal enlargement, where the scope of educational language rights is enlarged in the present EU countries which do not yet fulfil the requirements that we pose to the aspirant countries. This is equally true at an international

¹⁶ See EUD Update 2001 for an excellent overview of the situation of Sign languages in the European Union countries and a few more. See also Jokinen 2000.
level – many of the "rogue countries" have ratified more human rights
treaties than, for instance, the rogue country USA.

But implementation needs to follow, everywhere. If this is not done,
we will see still more of two developments. Firstly, we will see still more
discontent and growth of other signs of unequal societal treatment in
ethic minorities. This may, when all other strategies have been tried in
vain, lead to the use of less than democratic means to achieve at least
some equality. Secondly, strong extreme right wing parties, sometimes
close to neo-nazi ideologies, will be strengthened – the tendencies in the
West are already worrying. And, as a less than wise partial reaction to
this, we are already experiencing a general move towards the political
right, including overt expressions of xenophobic and sometimes racist
opinions even by social democratic parties. Democracy in all Europe and
other parts of the West is threatened by these developments. Similar
developments can be seen all over the world. Granting linguistic human
rights is not the problem but part of the badly needed solution.

In addition, we need to set ourselves still more ambitious goals. We
need to determine what kind of linguistic human rights, including educa-
tional language rights, are minimally necessary in order to prevent what is
called ethnic conflict, and ask all countries to fulfil them. The most
important right, the right to mother tongue medium education, is comple-
tely inadequately protected in existing instruments, and the level of know-
ledge of various governments is in serious need of enhancement, as is
shown by their inability to make even some of the most basic distinctions
noted in the replies to Max van der Stoel.

And when we think a bit further, we need to discuss what educational
linguistic human rights are necessary for maintaining linguistic and
cultural diversity on earth. If Europe, a linguistically extremely poor con-
tinent, with only 3 percent of the world's languages, cannot protect even
these few languages, we have no right to criticize others. In terms of the
responsibility for killing languages everywhere in the world, Europe and
the rest of Western countries bear a really heavy responsibility – and this
will fairly soon start backfiring in serious ways, both economically and
otherwise. Because biodiversity and linguistic and cultural diversity are
not only correlationally but very probably also causally linked, we are, by
killing linguistic diversity, also killing prerequisites for the maintenance
of biodiversity, and thereby prerequisites for life on the planet. The fate
and roles of small languages are the central point here. Since media and education are today the main direct culprits in this linguistic genocide, educational linguistic human rights are also decisive for the future of the planet. It is about the time that we start taking both languages and human rights seriously, and being honest in our evaluations of what we are doing.

Finally, a few words about linguistic and cultural ecologies and our responsibility for ruining or not ruining them. The impact of the recent positive developments in counteracting linguistic genocide in education and the killing of linguistic diversity is yet to be seen. We might learn from the history of killing biodiversity. Jared Diamond examines in the chapter 'The Golden Age That Never Was' in his 1992 book the evidence for people and cultures before us having completely ruined the prerequisites for their own life. They have destroyed their habitats and/or exterminated large numbers of species. This has happened in many places and it makes the 'supposed past Golden Age of environmentalism look increasingly mythical' (Diamond, 1992: 335). If we want to learn from it, and not make it happen on a global basis (this is our obvious risk today), we better heed his advice. Diamond claims (ibid., 335-336) the following (Table 14).

**Table 14. When do people ruin their environment beyond repair, according to Jared Diamond?**

... small long-established, egalitarian societies tend to evolve conservationist practices, because they’ve had plenty of time to get to know their local environment and to perceive their own self-interest. Instead, damage is likely to occur when people suddenly colonize an unfamiliar environment (like the first Maoris and Eastern Islanders); or when people advance along a new frontier (like the first Indians to reach America), so that they can just move beyond the frontier when they’ve damaged the region behind; or when people acquire a new technology whose destructive power they haven’t had time to appreciate (like modern New Guineans, now devastating pigeon populations with shotguns). Damage is also likely in centralized states that concentrate wealth in the hands of rulers who are out of touch with their environment.

Summary of Diamond’s factors:
1. Colonize an unfamiliar environment;
2. Advance along a new frontier;
3. Acquire a new technology whose destructive power people haven’t had time to appreciate;
4. Centralized states that concentrate wealth in the hands of rulers who are out of touch with their environment
As we can see, we have the perfect global prerequisites for ruining our planet beyond repair.

- Long-established small societies are breaking up, and, with urbanization and migration, people encounter new environments; factor 1.
- New technologies are more destructive than ever and results of biochemical and other experiments (like genetically modified crops) are taken into use before we know anything about the long-term effects on nature or people; factor 3.
- We have growing gaps and alienated elites; factor 4.
- And we do not have the new planets to move to when we have damaged this one; factor 2...

In terms of ruining our linguistic and cultural ecologies beyond repair, we know already that similar processes are at work. There are many similar analyses of destructive paradigms. Some researchers have also started the discussion trying to identify the languages-related devastating processes which are similar to the list of factors that Diamond has identified.

Summing up, then, learning new languages should be additive rather than subtractive. It should add to people’s linguistic repertoires; new languages, including lingua francas, should not be learned at the cost of the diverse mother tongues but in addition to them. In this sense, the Killer Languages, and English as the foremost among them, are serious threats towards the linguistic diversity of the world (see Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas 1997, 1999). Linguistic human rights are more needed than ever. So far, human rights instruments and discussions about both them and about educational language rights have not even started addressing these big questions in a coherent way where all types of ecology would be discussed within an integrated political and economic framework. When speakers of small languages learn other, necessary, languages in addition to their native languages, they become multilingual, and the maintenance of LD, necessary for the planet, is supported. When dominant languages, like English, are learned subtractively, at the cost of the mother tongues, they become killer languages.

I would not like to be more dramatic than necessary – but I would still like to remind ourselves: when our great grandchild asks: ‘why did you not stop this craziness? You could have done it!’, the one answer we cannot give is: I DID NOT KNOW. What are you going to do about this? Secondly, if some of you may feel provoked, even furious, please don’t shoot the messenger. Reflect rather on the message. Research into this area
is only in its beginning, but it might prove to be research vital for our
future. Luisa Maffi starts her Introduction to her new edited book On
Biocultural Diversity. Linking Language, Knowledge and the Environment
(2001) with a quote from Diane Ackerman (1997: xviii-xix) which sums
up the seriousness with which this new area should be taken:

We are among the rarest of the rare not because of our numbers, but because of
the unlikeliness of our being here at all, the pace of our evolution, our powerful
grip on the whole planet, and the precariousness of our future. We are evolution-
ary whiz kids who are better able to transform the world than to understand it.
Other animals cannot evolve fast enough to cope with us. It is possible that we
may also become extinct, and if we do, we will not be the only species that sabo-
taged itself, merely the only one that could have prevented it.

Bibliography

Amery, Rob 2000. Warrabarna Kaurna! Reclaiming an Australian
Language. Series Multilingualism and Linguistic Diversity. Lisse:
Swets & Zeitlinger.
Genocide in Education – or Worldwide Diversity and Human Rights?
Baugh, John 2000. Educational Malpractice and the Miseducation of
Language Minority Students. In Hall, Joan Kelly & Eggington,
Branson, Jan & Miller, Don 1998. Nationalism and the linguistic rights of
Deaf communities: Linguistic imperialism and the recognition and
development of sign languages. Journal of Sociolinguistics 2:1, 1998,
3-34.
Branson, Jan and Miller, Don 2000. Maintaining, developing and sharing
the knowledge and potential embedded in all our languages and
cultures: on linguists as agents of epistemic violence. In Phillipson
(ed.), 28-32.


McCarty, Teresa & Watahomigie, Lucille 1999. Indigenous community-
based education in the USA. In May (ed.), 79-94.
Mühlhäusler, Peter 1996. Linguistic ecology. Language change and
Mühlhäusler, Peter 2000. Language rights for the language of Norfolk
Mühlhäusler, Peter in press. English As An Exotic language. Paper given
at GNEL/MAVEN conference The Cultural Politics of English as a
World Language, 6-9 June 2001, Freiburg, Germany. In press in
conference publication, ed. Christian Mair.
Ozolins, Uldis 1999. Separating Language from Ethnicity: The paradoxes
of strict language policies and increasing social harmony in the Baltic
states. In Kontra et al. (eds), 245-262.
Pennycook, Alastair 1994. The cultural politics of English as an
international language. Harlow: Longman.
University Press.
Phillipson, Robert 1998. Globalizing English: are linguistic human rights
an alternative to linguistic imperialism? In Benson, Phil, Grundy, Peter
Phillipson, Robert (ed.) 2000. Rights to language. Equity, power and
Phillipson, Robert & Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1994. English – Panacea or
Pandemic? In Ammon, Ulrich, Mattheier, Klaus J. & Nelde, Peter (eds)
73-87.
Phillipson, Robert & Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1995. Linguistic rights and
Phillipson, Robert & Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1996. English Only Worldwide,
or Language Ecology. TESOL Quarterly. Ricento, Thomas &
Hornberger, Nancy (eds). Special-Topic Issue: Language Planning and
Policy, 429-452.
rights and English in Europe. World Englishes 16:1, 1997, Special is-
sue, English in Europe, eds. Marc G.Deneire & Michaël Goethals, 27-
based education in the USA. In May (ed.), 79-94.

Mühlhäusler, Peter 1996. Linguistic ecology. Language change and

Mühlhäusler, Peter 2000. Language rights for the language of Norfolk

Mühlhäusler, Peter in press. English As An Exotic language. Paper given
at GNEL/MAVEN conference The Cultural Politics of English as a
World Language, 6-9 June 2001, Freiburg, Germany. In press in
conference publication, ed. Christian Mair.

Ozolins, Uldis 1999. Separating Language from Ethnicity: The paradoxes
of strict language policies and increasing social harmony in the Baltic
states. In Kontra et al. (eds), 245-262.

Pennycook, Alastair 1994. The cultural politics of English as an
international language. Harlow: Longman.


University Press.

Phillipson, Robert 1998. Globalizing English: are linguistic human rights
an alternative to linguistic imperialism? In Benson, Phil, Grundy, Peter

Phillipson, Robert (ed.) 2000. Rights to language. Equity, power and

Phillipson, Robert & Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1994. English – Panacea or
Pandemic? In Ammon, Ulrich, Mattheier, Klaus J. & Nelde, Peter (eds)
73-87.

Phillipson, Robert & Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1995. Linguistic rights and

Phillipson, Robert & Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1996. English Only World-
wide, or Language Ecology. TESOL Quarterly. Ricento, Thomas &
Hornberger, Nancy (eds). Special-Topic Issue: Language Planning and
Policy, 429-452.

rights and English in Europe. World Englishes 16:1, 1997, Special is-
sue, English in Europe, eds. Marc G.Deneire & Michaël Goethals, 27-
43.
dimension of globalisation. In Graddol, David & Meinhof, Ulrike H.
(eds). English in a changing world. AILA Review 13 Oxford: The
English Book Centre, 19-36.
Posey, Darrell 1997. Conclusion of Darrell Posey’s ‘Biological and
Cultural Diversity – the Inextricable Linked by Language and Politics’.
Posey, Darrell A. (ed.) 1999. Cultural and Spiritual Values of
Biodiversity. New York: UNEP (United Nations Environmental
Prah, Kwesi Kwaa 1995. Mother Tongue for Scientific and Technological
Development in Africa. Bonn: Zentralstelle für Erziehung, Wissen-
schaft und Dokumentation (ZED) (German Foundation for Interna-
tional Development, Education, Science and Documentation Centre).
University of Tartu, Estonia. Forthcoming.
Rosas, Allan 1995. The right to development, in Eide et al. (eds), 247-255.
Rothenberger, Alexandra (compiler) 1997. Bibliography on the OSCE
High Commissioner on National Minorities: Documents, Speeches and
Related Publications. The Hague: The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic
Relations.
Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1996a. The colonial legacy in educational
language planning in Scandinavia – from migrant labour to a national
ethnic minority? International Journal of the Sociology of Language,
Vol. 118. Special Issue, Language Planning and Political Theory, Dua,
multilingual diversity or monolingual reductionism? In Hellinger,
New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 175-204.
Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1998. Human rights and language wrongs – a
future for diversity. In Benson et al. (eds), 5-27.
Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 1999. Linguistic diversity, human rights and the


Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove & Bucak, Sertaç 1994. Killing a mother tongue – how the Kurds are deprived of linguistic human rights. In Skutnabb-
Kangas et al. (eds), 347-370.